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ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION AND RULE 11
CARL TOBIAS*
The 1983 amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 has
been the most controversial revision in the half-century history of
the Federal Rules. Judges have applied amended Rule 11, which
requires them to sanction lawyers and parties who do not conduct
reasonable inquiries before filing papers, in over 1000 reported
opinions, considerably more unreported determinations, and numer-
ous informal contexts.1 The Rule has engendered much unnecessary
satellite litigation and has been implemented inconsistently, while
attorneys' fees remain the "sanction of choice" for violations Rule
11 activity has especially disadvantaged civil rights plaintiffs and
lawyers, whose lack of resources can make them risk averse. The
judiciary has sanctioned civil rights plaintiffs more than any other
category of civil litigant; in numerous districts, they were nearly
three times more likely to be sanctioned than other litigants3
Considerable evidence suggests that these developments have chilled
the enthusiasm of civil rights plaintiffs and attorneys. 4
Some observers of the Rule's implementation have wondered
whether this detrimental Rule 11 activity occurs in other forms of
public law litigation, such as environmental cases or products lia-
bility actions, or extends across the law. When soliciting public
comment on the provision's revision, the Judicial Conference Ad-
* Professor of Law, University of Montana School of Law. B.A., Duke University, 1968;
LL.B., University of Virginia, 1972. I wish to thank Tom France, Peggy Hesse, Scott
Mitchell, Peggy Sanner, and Jack Tuholske for valuable suggestions; Cecelia Palmer and
Charlotte Wilmerton for processing this piece; and the Harris Trust for generous, continuing
support. Any errors that remain are mine alone.
1. See COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
OF THE UNITED STATES, CALL FOR WRITTEN COMMENTS ON RULE 11 OF THE FEDERAL RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND RELATED RULES, reprinted in 131 F.R.D. 335, 344 (1990) [hereinafter
CALL FOR COMENTS]. For a discussion of the 1983 amendment and its effects, see infra
notes 11-20 and accompanying text.
2. See CO1mITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
OF THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, reprinted in 137 F.R.D.
53 (1991) [hereinafter PRELIMINARY DRAFT]; Attachment to letter from Hon. Sam C. Pointer,
Jr., Chairman, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, to Hon. Robert E. Keeton, Chairman,
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 1-2 (1991).
3. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, FINAL REPORT ON RULE 11, S IC, at 3 (1991) [hereinafter
FINAL REPORT]; Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.RJD. 189, 234-41
(1988).
4. See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Rule 11 Recalibrated in Civil Rights Cases, 36 VILL. L. REV. 105,
107-09 (1991); Vairo, supra note 3. at 200-01.
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visory Committee on the Civil Rules recently inquired whether Rule
11 has "been administered unfairly to any particular group of
lawyers or parties."8 The Advisory Committee also asked whether
Rule 11 has adversely affected attorneys or litigants with limited
resources, even if judges have been applying the Rule "with un-
exceptionable even-handedness."8 Indeed, Professor Melissa Nelken,
in a 1990 study of Rule 11, determined that the provision's damp-
ening "effect on lawyers' willingness to seek changes in the law is
not limited to certain types of practice, but is widespread, a finding
that has important implications for future developments in all areas
of law."7
Evaluators have analyzed very little formal, and virtually no
informal,8 Rule 11 activity in public law litigation apart from civil
rights cases. Because environmental lawsuits are a paradigmatic
type of public law litigation that contributes substantially to envi-
ronmental protection and to the development of public law in other
fields, it is important to scrutinize Rule 11 activity in environmental
cases. This Article undertakes that effort and is one of the first
attempts to study informal Rule 11 activity.
Part I of this Article briefly describes the developments that led
to the significant amendment of Rule 11 during 1983 and explains
what the revised Rule requires of attorneys, parties, and the federal
judiciary. The second Part evaluates the provision's implementation
in environmental litigation since August 1983. This examination
finds a low incidence of formal Rule 11 activity in environmental
cases and shows that the few courts that have formally applied the
Rule were solicitous of the needs of plaintiffs. Indeed, the study
reveals striking discontinuities between environmental lawsuits and
civil rights actions. Most important, judges have issued only four-
5. CALL FOR COMMENTS, supra note 1, 131 F.R.D. at 347.
6. See id. In August, 1991, the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on the Civil
Rules proposed that Rule 11 be amended. See PRELIMiNARY DRAFT, supra note 2, at xv, 137
F.R.D. at 63. The proposal remains nascent, is likely to be modified substantially, and, even
if left unchanged, would become effective in December, 1993, at the earliest. Moreover, the
focus of this Article is the implications of Rule 11 for federal court legal culture, not the
particulars of the current Rule or the proposal. The proposal, therefore, is not comprehen-
sively analyzed here, although it is mentioned when relevant to issues that are treated.
See generally Carl Tobias, Reconsidering Rule 11, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. (forthcoming 1992).
7. Melissa L. Nelken, The Impact of Federal Rule 11 on Lawyers and Judges in the
Northern District of California, 74 JUDICATURE 147, 152 (1990).
8. Formal Rule 11 activity involves invocation of the Rule that leads to published opinions,
while informal activity is more subtle, typically involving hints or threats to use the Rule.
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teen published opinions in environmental cases9 which contrasts
markedly with the approximately 500 published decisions in civil
rights suits. 0
Because assessors have evaluated a small amount of informal
Rule 11 activity and because informal activity has seriously disad-
vantaged civil rights plaintiffs, this Article analyzes informal Rule
11 activity. The study indicates that judges and environmental
defendants have invoked the provision somewhat more frequently
in informal, than in formal, situations but that environmental plain-
tiffs have been disadvantaged substantially less than civil rights
plaintiffs. Moreover, this Rule 11 activity has neither dissuaded
potential litigants from initiating environmental suits nor prevented
parties who filed cases from vigorously pursuing the actions.
Part III of this Article affords explanations for these findings,
particularly the dearth of Rule 11 activity, and explores how that
paucity informs understanding of the contemporary legal culture in
the federal courts. The segment specifically examines the perspec-
tives on environmental litigation of judges, attorneys, and parties
who actively participate in such litigation. By refracting Rule 11
through the prism of environmental lawsuits and comparing that
experience with Rule 11 activity in civil rights cases, the study
enhances comprehension of modern civil litigation.
I. 1983 AMENDMENT OF RuLE 11
The considerations that prompted the Supreme Court and Con-
gress to revise Rule 11-which was one of the original Federal
Rules promulgated in 1938 and had remained unchanged until
1983-warrant only cursory examination here, as they have been
competently chronicled elsewhere." The reluctance of lawyers to
9. See infra note 26 and accompanying text.
10. This is a conservative estimate that is premised on several considerations. I began
with Professor Vairo's claim that the federal courts issued 191 reported Rule 11 opinions
involving civil rights between the August 1983 effective date of the amendment and
December 15, 1987. See id. I then extrapolated from that figure for reported opinions-
widely considered to be the "tip of the iceberg"-to published opinions that judges have
issued since August 1983. STEPHEN B. BURBANK, RuLE 11 IN TRANSITION THE REPORT OF
THE THmID Cmcurr TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE OF CwvL PROCEDURE 11, at 56 n.205, 56-
59 (1989). Elizabeth Wiggins and Thomas Willging, who had substantial responsibility for
producing the Final Report, supra note 3, have estimated that "one to ten percent of the
judiciary's application of the Rule to sanctions motions appears in reported determinations:'
Tobias, supra note 6, at 9 n.52.
11. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The
1992]
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invoke the Rule and of courts to impose sanctions led to its disuse.m
During the mid-1970's, however, numerous judges, including Chief
Justice Warren Burger, and some writers began to perceive that
the federal courts were experiencing a "litigation explosion."13 They
suggested that lawyers and parties were filing a growing number
of civil lawsuits, too few of which had merit.14 The judges and
commentators asserted that the Federal Rules, especially by pro-
viding for flexible pleading and open-ended discovery, permitted
attorneys and parties to misuse, overuse, and abuse the litigation
process.15
Notwithstanding the controversial character of these propositions
and the lack of data underlying the concepts,16 the Advisory Com-
mittee and the Supreme Court proposed that Rules 11, 16, and 26
be fundamentally modified as one response to the difficulties per-
ceived.17 Congress did not reject the recommendations, and the
amendments became effective in August, 1983.18
Revised Rule 11 imposes substantially greater responsibilities on
lawyers and litigants and increases judicial control over civil law-
Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1927-29 (1989); Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions
Under Amended Federal Rule 11-Some "Chilling" Problems in the Struggle Between Com-
pensation and Punishment, 74 GEo. L.J. 1313, 1314-17 (1986). See generally D. Michael
Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problems with Federal
Rue of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REV. 1, 35-42 (1976) (discussing pre-1976 history of
Rule 11).
12. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 198-201
(1983). See generally ARTHUR MILLER, THE 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY
12-15 (1984); Risinger, supra note 11, at 34-37.
13. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740-41 (1975); Warren
E. Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D.-A Need For Systematic Anticipation, in THE POUND
CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 23 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R.
Wheeler eds., 1979). See generally Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374
(1982) (questioning judicial management techniques as a means to control increasing case-
loads); Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74
CORNELL L. REV. 270, 287-96 (1989) (discussing increasing civil caseloads and attendant
abuse).
14. See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 34445 (1979). See generally Thomas
B. Marvell, Caseload Growth-Past and Future Trends, 71 JUDICATURE 151 (1987) (discussing
continuing rise of civil lawsuits in the 1980's).
15. See National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976)
(per curiam); Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 440-43 (1986); Arthur R. Miller, The Adversary
System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (1984).
16. See MILLER, supra note 12, at 10; Burbank, supra note 11, at 19Z7-28; Maurice
Rosenberg, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Action: Assessing Their Impact, 137 U. PA.
L. REV. 2197, 2198-202 (1989).
17. Rosenberg, supra note 16, at 2203.
18. See Order Amending Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 461 U.S. 1097 (1983). See
generally MILLER, supra note 12.
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suits. It requires that practitioners and parties perform reasonable
factual investigations and legal inquiries before filing papers while
commanding that courts sanction them for not doing so.' 9 The
Advisory Committee Note that accompanies the Rule also admon-
ishes federal judges that Rule 11 is "not intended to chill an
attorney's enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing factual or legal
theories."2o
II. RULE 11 ACTrrY IN ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION
A. A Word About Methodology
"Environmental litigation," as used in this Article, comprises civil
lawsuits that involve some "institutional" litigant, such as the gov-
ernment, or a public interest organization, such as the Sierra Club,
and are filed under federal pollution control, public lands, or natural
resource protection and preservation legislation, such as the Clean
Water Act or the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).2' It
19. The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer
that the signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best
of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable
inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good
faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and
that it is not interposed for any improper purpose .... If a pleading, motion,
or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or
upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a repre-
sented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to
pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses
incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including
a reasonable attorney's fee.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
Numerous courts deemphasize the reasonableness of inquiries that preceded the filing of
papers (conduct) and stress the merits of the litigation or the quality of the papers submitted
(product). See, e.g., Davis v. Carl, 906 F.2d 533, 538 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that "creative
claims, coupled even with ambiguous or inconsequential facts, may merit dismissal but not
punishment"); Romero v. City of Pomona, 883 F.2d 1418, 1429 (9th Cir. 1989) (emphasizing
frivolousness of claims). But see Gutierrez v. City of Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1494, 1500-01
(S.D. Fla. 1989) (emphasizing conduct over product). The courts that emphasize product
typically speak of "frivolous" papers. I have followed that practice here as shorthand to
describe a paper that is not "well grounded in fact" nor "warranted legally," although I
have criticized the product approach. See Carl Tobias, Certaieation and Civi Rights, 136
F.R.D. 223, 226 nn.20-21 (1991). See generally Burbank, supra note 11, at 1933-34, 1941-42
(discussing conduct and product approaches and proposing that judges look to prefiling
conduct as a way of achieving uniformity in Rule 11 determinations).
20. FED. R. Crv. P. 11 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.RD.. 165, 199 (1983).
21. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), 33 U.S.C. SS 1251-1387
(1988); National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. SS 4321, 4331-35 (1988); ef NAN ARON,
LmERTY AND JusTiCE FOR ALL: PuBIuc INTEREST LAW IN THE 1980s AND BEYOND (1989)
(analyzing public interest litigants as institutional litigants); PETER H. ScHucK, SUING
GOVERNmNT (1983) (discussing government as institutional litigant).
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includes, therefore, civil cases that the government pursues to
secure compliance with applicable statutes.
Although environmental litigation could encompass suits that
litigants bring under common law theories, such as nuisance or
trespass, which typically involve private parties and private prop-
erty, these cases are not included because they experienced prac-
tically no formal Rule 11 activity.2 I also exclude litigation seeking
to allocate responsibility for the disposal and cleanup of hazardous
or toxic substances between private entities, principally corpora-
tions and insurers, primarily pursuant to legislation such as the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Lia-
bility Act (CERCLA).P Those suits should not be characterized as
"public law litigation," even though the potential for cleaning up
the wastes certainly implicates "public interests."24
B. Formal Rule 11 Activity in Environmental Litigation
1. Data
The most important aspects of Rule 11's implementation in
environmental litigation since its August 1983 effective date are
the dearth of formal Rule 11 activity and the solicitude that
federal judges have exhibited for the needs of environmental
plaintiffs when formally enforcing the provision.25 These consid-
22. The closest analogy that I found was litigation pursued by homeowners' associations.
See, e.g., Westlake N. Property Owners Ass'n v. City of Thousand Oaks, 915 F.2d 1301 (9th
Cir. 1990) (holding that although the district court had jurisdiction to impose sanctions, the
actions of the homeowners' association were not so frivolous as to warrant Rule 11 sanctions,
Collin County v. HAN.E.N., 654 F. Supp. 943 (N.D. Tex. 1987) (ruling that Rule 11
enforcement is a "method for preventing meritless suits against public officials" but that
in the instant case the homeowners' association would be given an extension to file an
amended counterclaim); see also Petit v. County of Essex, No. 91-CV-404, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9942, at *8-14 (N.D.N.Y. July 15, 1991) (imposing Rule 11 sanctions on landowners'
attorney for frivolous complaint seeking declaratory judgment to halt landfill construction);
Westfield Partners, Ltd. v. Hogan, 744 F. Supp. 189, 192-94 (N.D. Ill, 1990) (imposing Rule
11 sanctions against developer's attorney for frivolous action against homeowners); cf Boone
v. United States, 743 F. Supp. 1367, 1378 (D. Haw. 1990) (ruling that government counsel's
motion to amend or alter judgment for owner of artificial lagoon in suit to secure owner's
right to deny public access was insufficiently egregious to warrant sanctions).
23. 42 U.S.C. SS 9601-9675 (1988).
24. For discussion of "public interest litigation," see Tobias, supra note 13, at 282-83; cf
GLENWN A. SCHUBERT, THE PuBLIC INTERFST (1960) (discussing the public interest); Ernest
Gellhorn, Public Participation in Administrative Proceedings, 81 YALE L.J. 359, 360 (1972)
(same). Although hazardous and toxic substances litigation is excluded from the data
compilation, some of the cases are employed for illustrative purposes. See, e.g., infra notes
57, 67 and accompanying text.
25. Their lack of resources can make public interest litigants and environmental plaintiffs
[Vol. 33:429
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erations contrast markedly with Rule 11 activity in civil rights
litigation. Since August 1983, federal courts have rendered four-
teen published opinions applying Rule 11 in environmental law-
suits, while the federal judiciary issued 191 reported Rule 11
decisions involving civil rights between that date and December
15, 1987, alone.26
District judges found that environmental plaintiffs contravened
the Rule in five cases, but appellate courts reversed two of these
determinations27 One trial judge decided that an environmental
defendant apparently had contravened Rule 11.P Even when
courts held that environmental litigants had violated the provi-
sion, no parties suffered substantial monetary sanctions.2
risk averse. See Carl Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigati 37 BUFF. L. REv. 485, 495-
98 (1988-89) (discussing these concepts in civil rights litigation). I recognize that all of these
litigants may not suffer resource deficiencies. Indeed, some environmental public interest
litigants, such as the National Wildlife Federation, have several million members and
comparatively large annual budgets. "Environmental plaintiffs" are public interest litigants,
or other litigants, such as the government, that purport to represent the public interest.
See ARON, supra note 21, at 3-4. They do not include entities that represent regulated
interests. See Oliver A. Houck, With ChairtyforAU, 93 YALE L.J. 1415, 1465-68, 1544 (1984)
(questioning whether business-sponsored public interest law firms are truly "public interest"
or charitable for tax purposes).
26. This Article analyzes or cites 12 of the environmental cases. The other two cases,
which seem insufficiently important to warrant treatment, are Polger v. Republic National
Bank, 709 F. Supp. 204 (D. Colo. 1989) and United States v. Alexander, No. G-86-267, 1988
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9307 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 16, 1988). See also United States v. Alexander, 771
F. Supp. 830 (S.D. Tex. 1991) (discussing subsequent Rule 11 developments); Vairo, supra
note 3, at 200 (describing study that located 191 reported civil rights cases). "Published"
opinions are those available on computerized reporting systems; "reported" opinions are
those published in the federal reporter system.
27. See Westlake N. Property Owners Ass'n v. City of Thousand Oaks, 915 F.2d 1301,
1302 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Stringfellow, 911 F.2d 225, 226 (9th Cir. 1990); see also
Maine Audubon Soc'y v. Purslow, 907 F.2d 265, 266 (1st Cir. 1990); Anderson v. Beatrice
Foods Co., 900 F.2d 388, 395-96 (1st Cir. 1990); cf. Glaser v. Cincinnati Milacron, Inc., 808
F.2d 285, 286, 291 (3d Cir. 1986) (reversing trial court's $165,000 attorney fee award under
pre-1983 version of Rule 11 to defendant benzene manufacturers); Atlantic States Legal
Found., Inc. v. Avtex Fibers, Inc., Civ. Act. No. 87-39E (W.D. Pa. Dec. 16, 1988) (unpublished
opinion imposing $5000 sanction on environmental plaintiff whose attorneys alleged "current
and continuing" violations of the Clean Water Act even though defendants' plant had closed
four months before).
28. See United States v. City of Menominee, 727 F. Supp. 1110, 1118 (W.D. Mich. 1989)
(implying a violation by environmental defendant occurred, but delaying decision until
defendant had been heard on the issue). This is one of the few cases in which environmental
plaintiffs sought sanctions. See also Westfield Partners, Ltd. v. Hogan, 744 F. Supp. 189,
192-94 (N.D. Il. 1990) (granting plaintiff homeowners' motion for sanctions against developer).
29. See, e.g., Westlake, 915 F.2d at 1302 (reversing sanction order); Strigfellow, 911 F.2d
at 226 (no sanction ordered); Purslow, 907 F.2d at 266 (joint sanction of $250 imposed upon
two attorneys); Anderson, 900 F.2d at 395 (Rule 11 violation by plaintiff and Rule 37 violation
by defendant offset each other, no monetary sanction imposed); City of Menominee, 727 F.
Supp. at 1118 (no sanction ordered); Avtex Fibers, slip op. at 5 ($5000 sanction imposed on
environmental plaintiff).
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2. Case Law
a. Judicial Application Solicitous of Environmental
Plaintiffs
(1). Rule 11 Violations
Few of the federal judges who considered sanctioning environ-
mental plaintiffs found that the litigants contravened Rule 11.
Courts have determined that only a minuscule number of envi-
ronmental plaintiffs failed to perform reasonable prefiling inves-
tigations of the facts or had filed papers that were not factually
well grounded. 30
The judges seemed to appreciate that factual issues are undis-
puted or are of limited consequence in some environmental cases.
The courts appeared to comprehend that, in numerous other
lawsuits involving contested facts, plaintiffs had assembled and
assessed pertinent data or that the parties lacked access to, or
resources for collecting, complex information relevant to Rule 11
compliance.
For example, in complicated water pollution litigation, one
district court rejected the defendant's argument that most of the
"allegations in plaintiffs' complaint [were] 'not well grounded in
fact.' "31 The judge found that the "issues and allegations con-
cerned in this case are very complex, and that there is no showing
of bad faith or failure to conduct a reasonable inquiry by plain-
tiffs." 32
Courts also have been reluctant to conclude that environmental
plaintiffs neglected to undertake reasonable prefiling inquiries
into the law or submitted papers that were not warranted by
existing law or by good faith arguments for the extension, mod-
ification, or reversal of that law. Some judges apparently believed
or understood that environmental litigation involves complicated
issues of law and complex legal theories and that environmental
law is a dynamic, evolving field, primarily because of the massive,
convoluted statutory schemes that underlie many environmental
suits.33
30. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
31. See Northwest Envtl. Defense Ctr. v. Unified Sewerage Agency, Civ. No. 88-1128-FR,
1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8311, at *33 (D. Or. July 7, 1989).
32. Id. at *33-34.
33. Many judges, members of Congress, and commentators agree that CERCLA and the
Clean Air and Clean Water legislation are complex. Indeed, the 1990 amendments to the
air legislation are several hundred pages long. Cf. Vairo, supra note 3, at 202 (making
assertions similar to those in text regarding Rule l's application in securities/Racketeering
Influenced Corrupt Organizations (RICO)Itrade regulation cases).
[Vol. 33:429
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Illustrative are two recent Ninth Circuit opinions in which the
court found that the trial courts had abused their discretion in
holding that environmental plaintiffs were asserting frivolous
legal theories.3 The circuit court reversals are telling because
the abuse of discretion standard of appellate review, which the
Supreme Court articulated last year for all Rule 11 determina-
tions, is extremely deferential. s5
In one of these cases, the Ninth Circuit first observed that an
attorney's failure to inform the judge of pertinent statutory or
case authority would not alone support the imposition of sanc-
tions.6 The panel characterized certain case law interpreting
CERCLA that the plaintiff did not cite as "relevant but distin-
guishable" and remarked that even the holding of a district court
in the Northern District of Illinois that was directly on point
would not make the plaintiffs motion to a trial judge in the
Ninth Circuit frivolous.s" The appellate court generously read the
ambiguous provision of the complicated CERCLA legislation at
issue and employed the lenient standard of whether the disputed
statutory terminology "plausibly supported" the plaintiff's legal
contention.e
A different panel of the court applied an equally flexible
standard, asking whether "at least an arguable question" existed
as to the complex legal issue of whether local residents are
"bound as privies to judgments" entered in environmental liti-
gation against municipalities in which they live.19 The Ninth
Circuit invoked recent Supreme Court precedent that "cast doubt
on whether non-party suits were to be treated as impermissible
collateral attacks on previous federal court judgments" and con-
cluded that plaintiffs could make a reasonable, good faith argu-
ment for their legal position.4
34. See Westlake N. Property Owners' Ass'n v. City of Thousand Oaks, 915 F.2d 1301,
1307 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Stringfellow, 911 F.2d 225, 227 (9th Cir. 1990).
35. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2461 (1990) (specifying that a
district court abuses its discretion if its Rule 11 determination is based on an erroneous
view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence).
36. See Stringrf ow, 911 F.2d at 226.
37. See id at 227; see also Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 685 F.
Supp. 651 (NJD. i. 1988) (underlying case that plaintiff in Stringfellow failed to cite).
38. See Stringfelow, 911 F.2d at 226-27; see also United States v. Environmental Waste
Control, Inc., No. 887-55 (RLM), 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11,710, at *41 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 6,
1991) (holding that a novel, yet rational, approach to a complex motion for proceedings
supplemental is not sanctionable).
39. Westlake N. Property Owners Ass'n v. City of Thousand Oaks, 915 F.2d 1301, 1307
(9th Cir. 1990).
40. Id. (citing Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989)). Congress modified Wilks in the Civil
19921
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Some courts closely scrutinized the Rule 11 motions filed against
environmental plaintiffs. One district judge characterized a de-
fendant's request for sanctions as frivolous and refused to "waste
the court's time addressing it."'41 A second trial judge denied a
motion by defense counsel, remarking that the provision should
be reserved for exceptional circumstances. 42
A district court's determination in another case demonstrates
how unwilling some judges have been to find that environmental
plaintiffs contravened Rule 11. The trial court dismissed the
plaintiffs' complaint, although the judge observed that the plain-
tiffs had failed to show that their opponents "violated a single
law" and stated that one of the plaintiffs' claims was "difficult
at best to grasp, and once understood borders precariously on
frivolity."4 The court rejected the defendant's motion for sanc-
tions and granted the plaintiffs leave to replead but issued stern
warnings that their pleadings had "already evinced unacceptable
carelessness," that any revised papers would be evaluated
"through Rule 11-colored glasses," and that "one method for pre-
venting meritless suits against public officials is rigid enforce-
ment of Rule 11." 44
One district court implied that the request of an environmental
plaintiff for the judge to impose Rule 11 sanctions against a
corporate defendant was justified.45 The judge found that the
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, S 108. See generally Susan S.
Grover, The Silence Majoriy: Martin v. Wilks and the Legislative Response, 1991 U. ILL.
L. Ray. (forthcoming 1991) (examining Wilks and Congress' 1990 effort to enact S 6 of the
1990 Civil Rights Act, which would have barred collateral challenges to consent decrees);
George M. Stricder, Jr., Martin v. Wilks, 64 TUL. L. Rav. 1557 (1990).
41. Student Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc. v. P.D. Oil & Chem. Storage, 627 F. Supp.
1074, 1085 (D.N.J. 1986).
42. International Union, UAW v. Amerace Corp., 30 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1353, 1358-
59 (D.N.J. 1989); see also Environmental Waste Control, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11,710, at
*42 (plaintiff's motion failed to evidence the total disregard of existing law that warrants
sanctions). See generally infra note 162 and accompanying text (discussing federal agencies'
invocation of Rule 11 only in exceptional circumstances).
43. Collin County v. H.A.V.E.N., 654 F. Supp. 943, 952-53 (N.D. Tex. 1987). The "plaintiff'
homeowners' association actually was a "counterplaintiff." See id. at 945.
44. See id. at 954. Several additional judges, sua sponte, have cautioned environmental
parties to be alert to the possible future application of Rule 11. See, eg., Loveladies Harbor,
Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 381, 398 (1988) (stating that Rule 11 would be the appropriate
remedy if plaintiffs criticisms of defendant's arguments in opposition to a takings claim
based on the denial of a wetlands fill permit were well grounded); Corren v. New York
Univ. No. 86 Civ. 7199 (CSH), 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11,456, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 1987)
(cautioning that if a plaintiff repleads seeking federal question jurisdiction under the Clean
Air Act for his wrongful termination claim, he and counsel should keep Rule 11 in mind).
45. See United States v. City of Menominee, 727 F. Supp. 1110, 1118 (W.D. Mich. 1989).
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company's behavior "was not warranted by existing Eleventh
Amendment law" and that its reply brief included no "argument
for the extension, modification or reversal of the governing
authorities cited by the court. '46
(2). Imposition of Mandatory Sanctions
Those few judges who determined that environmental plaintiffs
had contravened Rule 11 appeared solicitous of the litigants'
needs when effectuating the mandatory duty to levy appropriate
sanctions. 47 The courts seemed to recognize, for instance, that
significant resource disparities can exist between many environ-
mental plaintiffs and their adversaries and that the imposition
of large financial assessments can chill the plaintiffs' enthusiasm.4
The judges apparently have attempted to levy the "least severe
sanction necessary" or to tailor sanctions to Rule l1's primary
purpose of deterrence, and courts have employed nonmonetary
alternatives or have consulted numerous equitable factors, such
as the ability of violators to pay, in imposing financial sanctions. 49
No judge has held an environmental plaintiff responsible for the
attorneys' fees that its opponents incurred.
Two recent First Circuit cases are illustrative. In Maine Au-
dubon Society v. Purslow,w the First Circuit sustained the district
court ruling which ordered that two attorneys for the Maine
Audubon Society who were "respected members of the Maine
bar jointly pay a small monetary sanction ($250.00)" for violating
Rule 11.51
The "plaintiff" was a state governmental agency. The court delayed a final decision on
sanctions because the defendant had a right to be heard on the issue and to raise any
pertinent defense. See also Westfield Partners, Ltd. v. Hogan, 744 F. Supp. 189, 192-93 (N.D.
MI1. 1990) (involving a private property dispute in which the court imposed Rule 11 sanctions
on a plaintiff developer at the instigation of the individual landowner defendants).
46. City of Menominee, 727 F. Supp. at 1118.
47. Rule 11 requires that judges impose appropriate sanctions which may encompass
reasonable expenses such as attorneys' fees. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11, supra note 19.
48. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
49. The courts deciding environmental cases do not specifically state what is said in the
text, although judges treating sanctions in civil rights cases have. See, eg., Doering v.
Union County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d 191, 196-97 (3d Cir. 1988) (involving
equitable factors and nonmonetary alternatives); Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836
F.2d 866, 876-78 (5th Cir. 1988) (imposing least severe sanction and considering nonmonetary
alternatives, Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1556-57 (11th Cir. 1987) (tailoring sanctions
to deterrence).
50. 907 F.2d 265 (1st Cir. 1990).
51. Id- at 266, affg No. 87-0297 (D. Me. Dec. 14, 1989) (order fixing sanctions).
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In the second case, Anderson v. Beatrice Foods,52 the trial court
determined that the decision of plaintiff's counsel to continue the
prosecution of a claim, which the attorneys knew by the conclu-
sion of investigation and discovery lacked any factual basis,
clearly contravened the Rule.0 Nonetheless, the trial judge de-
cided, and the First Circuit affirmed, that the magnitude of the
sanction warranted by the plaintiff's Rule 11 violation approxi-
mated that attributable to defendant's contravention of Rule 37
discovery requirements, so that the sanctions offset each other
and should be imposed on neither party.4
(8). Concern About Chilling Effects
In considering whether environmental plaintiffs violated the
Rule or in choosing appropriate sanctions when plaintiffs were
in contravention, a small number of courts have expressed con-
cern about possible chilling effects. 5 For instance, when the First
Circuit upheld a small financial assessment that the trial court
imposed on lawyers representing an environmental plaintiff, the
appellate court observed that it had "no inclination to transform
Rule 11 into a refrigeration device designed to chill reasonable
creativity on counsel's part."56 District judges resolving several
environmental cases involving corporations or insurers have sim-
ilarly warned that Rule 11 was not meant to discourage the
zealous pursuit of legal or factual theories in developing fields
of law, such as CERCLA.5 7
52. 129 F.R.D. 394 (D. Mass. 1989).
53. See id. at 403-04.
54. See Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 129 FARD. 394, 403-04 (D. Mass. 1989); Anderson
v. Beatrice Foods Co., 900 F.2d 388, 395 (1st. Cir. 1990).
55. This treatment mirrors the substantial concern evinced recently about Rule ll's
chilling effects in civil rights cases. See, e.g., Mareno v. Rowe, 910 F.2d 1043, 1047 (2d Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 681 (1991); Davis v. Carl, 906 F2d 533, 538 (11th Cir. 1990)
Jones v. Westside-Urban Health Ctr., 760 F. Supp. 1575, 1581 (S.D. Ga. 1991); see also
Tobias, supra note 4, at 110-16 (discussing recent federal appellate opinions solicitous of the
needs of civil rights plaintiffs and their counsel).
56. Maine Audubon Soc'y v. Purslow, 907 F.2d 265, 268; see also United States v.
Environmental Waste Control, Inc., 131 B.R. 410, 426 (N.D. Ind. 1991) (stating that "[T]he
application of Rule 11 to legal arguments requires a balance between the need to penalize
those who pursue frivolous litigation and the danger of deterring litigants or attorneys
from arguing for a change in the law").
57. See, e.g., Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., No. 85 C 1142, 1989
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4194, at *17 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 11, 1989); South Shore Bank v. Stewart Title
Guar. Co., 688 F. Supp. 803, 806 (D. Mass.), affid mer., 867 F.2d 607 (1st Cir. 1988) New
York v. Shore Realty Corp., 648 F. Supp. 255, 267 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
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b. Judicial Application Less Solicitous of Environmental
Plaintiffs
This solicitous formal judicial application of Rule 11 does not
necessarily mean that the provision's enforcement was without
difficulty for environmental plaintiffs and their counsel. Indeed,
some courts have been or at least have seemed relatively unre-
sponsive to the needs of these parties and attorneys.
Judges have found that environmental plaintiffs violated the
Rule in several situations that can fairly be characterized as
"close." The two First Circuit cases are illustrative.e Different
panels of the court sustained decisions of district judges in Maine
and Massachusetts that environmental plaintiffs had violated Rule
11, stating that litigants found in violation bear a "heavy burden
of demonstrating that the trial judge was clearly not justified in
entering [the] order."' 5 9
The panel that considered the determination of the Maine
district court, even while imposing this onerous requirement and
applying the Supreme Court's new deferential standard of ap-
pellate review, described the case as close: "[W]e are left shy of
a definite and firm conviction that a serious mistake was made."6'
The First Circuit upheld the trial judge's decision, observing that
the "duty of-reasonable inquiry includes, as we see it, a duty of
reasonable disclosure [of the relevant law]," especially when law-
yers proceed ex parte.61 The appellate panel ruled that the sixty
day notice requirement of the Endangered Species Act,62 with
which plaintiff argued it had substantially complied, must be
strictly construed, thus rejecting plaintiff's legal theory.0
58. See Purslow, 907 F.2d 265; Anderson, 900 F.2d 388.
59. Purslow, 907 F.2d at 268 (quoting Anderson, 900 F.2d at 393 (citation omitted));
Anderson, 900 F.2d at 393 (quoting Spiller v. U.S.V. Labs., Inc., 842 F.2d 535, 537 (1st Cir.
1988)).
60. Purslow, 907 F.2d at 266, 269.
61. Id. at 268-69. But see United States v. Stringfellow, 911 F.2d 225, 226 (9th Cir. 1990)
(holding that failure to inform judge of pertinent authority would not alone support the
imposition of sanctions). The attorney in Purslow was seeking a temporary restraining
order, and the court recognized that time restraints may have hampered counsel.
62. 16 U.S.C. SS 1531-1544 (1988).
63. Purslow, 907 F.2d at 268; cf. Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20 (1989) (holding
that 60 day notice requirement of Resource Conservation and Recovery Act's citizen suit
provision is a mandatory condition precedent to commencing suit); Garcia v. Cecos Int'l,
Inc., 761 F.2d 76, 78-82 (1st Cir. 1985) (holding that plaintiff must give actual notice of intent
to sue at least 60 days before filing a complaint under the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act); City of Highland Park v. Train, 519 F2d 681 (7th Cir. 1975) (enforcing a
strict 60 day notice requirement), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 927 (1976).
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The other First Circuit panel affirmed the finding of the
Massachusetts district judge that attorneys for environmental
plaintiffs violated Rule 11 by pursuing certain claims after in-
vestigation and discovery had revealed that they lacked an ob-
jective basis in fact.64 The First Circuit stated that Rule 11
imposes a continuing duty on parties and lawyers, although a
substantial majority of the appellate courts addressing the issue
have clearly rejected that interpretation.p
When environmental plaintiffs contravene the Rule, some judges
seem insufficiently appreciative of the litigants' needs in choosing
proper sanctions. For instance, certain courts apparently have
not tried to impose the least severe sanction, while other judges
have failed to consider nonmonetary options or several important
equitable factors, such as ability to pay or the gravity of the
violation, in calculating the financial sanctions that they as-
sessed." Moreover, a few courts have levied large awards in
cases involving corporations and insurers.6 7
Numerous judges have not mentioned in their opinions the
potential for dampening the enthusiasm of environmental plain-
64. See Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 900 F.2d 388, 393-96 (1st Cir. 1990), aff'g 129
F.R.D. 394, 403-04 (). Mass. 1989).
65. See id. at 393; of. Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., 111 S.
Ct. 922, 943 n.5 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (refusing to recognize continuing duty when
issue not briefed). See Dahnke v. Teamsters Local 695, 906 F.2d 1192, 1200 (7th Cir. 1990)
(holding that Rule 11 imposes no continuing dutyh Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. Associated Contractors, Inc., 877 F.2d
938, 943 (11th Cir. 1989) (same), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1079 (1990); Thomas v. Capital See.
Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 874-75 (5th Cir. 1988) (en bane) (same); Oliveri v. Thompson, 803
F.2d 1265, 1273-74 (2d Cir. 1986) (same), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918 (1987h Gaiardo v. Ethyl
Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 484 (3d Cir. 1987) (same). One panel of the Sixth Circuit, in Jackson v.
Law Firm of O'Hara, Ruberg, Osborne & Taylor, 875 F.2d 1224, 1229 (6th Cir. 1989), cast
doubt on the idea of a continuing duty that another panel of the court apparently articulated
in Herron v. Jupiter Transportation Co., 858 F.2d 332, 336 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that
continuing duty exists). A similar situation obtains in the Fourth Circuit. One panel of the
court, in Brubaker v. City of Richmond, 943 F.2d 1363, 1382 (4th Cir. 1991), cast doubt on
the idea of a continuing duty that another panel of the court apparently articulated in Blue
v. United States Department of the Army, 914 F.2d 525, 544-46 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 1580 (1991). See also PRELIMINARY DRAFr, supr note 2, at 2 (setting forth proposed
Rule 11(b), which would impose a continuing duty). In a recent case finding that plaintiffs
violated Rule 11, the plaintiffs' counsel apparently did not deserve much solicitude. See
Petit v. County of Essex, No. 91-CV-404, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9942 (N.D.N.Y. July 15,
1991).
66. Most of the cases discussed above did not specifically discuss what sanction might
be the least severe or expressly consult equitable factors. See supra note 49 and accompa-
nying text.
67. See, e.g., Teleconferencing Sys., Inc. v. Databeam Corp., Civ. Act. No. 88-470-A, 1989
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10733, at *50 (E.D. Va. Apr. 27, 1989, Can Am Indus. v. Firestone Tire
& Rubber Co., 631 F. Supp. 1180, 1188 (C.D. M. 1986). But see Arco Indus. v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 730 F. Supp. 59, 70 (W.D. Mich. 1989) (imposing modest monetary sanction).
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tiffs, and a small number of courts have appeared relatively
unconcerned about chilling effects.e The strict warnings, which
seem like threats that Rule 11 sanctions might be imposed,
levelled by a few judges against environmental plaintiffs and
their counsel, could discourage these parties and lawyers.6 9
A New Jersey district court also issued an opinion-although
not for publication in the federal reporter system-that detri-
mentally affects some environmental plaintiffs.70 The plaintiff, a
public interest litigant that had prevailed on the merits, sought
to recover attorneys' fees for time spent in drafting a notice of
intent to sue,.71 a requirement included in numerous environmental
statutes.72 The plaintiff argued that Rule 11 made "absolutely
indispensable" the rather extensive prefiling investigation into
the facts that it had conducted.73 The judge rejected this conten-
tion, observing that "[p]re-notice of intent to sue activity is
analogous to investigative work and as such, is not compensa-
ble."74
The 1990 Supreme Court case Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp 75
and the Court's 1991 decision in Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic
Communications Enterprises76 also could have deleterious conse-
quences for environmental plaintiffs. Application of the very
deferential abuse of discretion standard of appellate review that
the Supreme Court enunciated in Cooter will make it more dif-
ficult for environmental plaintiffs to convince appellate courts to
reverse the adverse Rule 11 determinations of district judges.77
The Supreme Court majority in Business Guides held that
represented parties who sign papers have "an affirmative duty
to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the facts and the law before
68. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
69. See supra note 44.
70. Student Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Anchor Thread Co., Civ. No. 84-
320(GEB), 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4348 (D.N.J. May 1, 1988).
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. S 1365(b) (1988) (Clean Water Act notice of intent to sue require-
ment); 42 U.S.C. S 7604(b) (1988) (same requirement in the Clean Air Act)..
73. Anchor Thread, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4348, at *5.
74. Id.; accord Student Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 721 F. Supp.
604, 615 (D.N.J), affid mem, 870 F.2d 652 (3d Cir.), and modified on reconsideration, 727 F.
Supp. 876 (D.N.J. 1989); Proffitt v. Municipal Auth., 716 F. Supp. 845, 851 (E.D. Pa. 1989),
arfd mem, 897 F.2d 523 (1990). But cf. Golden Gate Audubon Soc'y v. United States Army
Corps of Eng'rs, 732 F. Supp. 1014, 1017-19 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (holding activity in preparation
for filing of notice of intent to sue is compensable under Equal Access to Justice Act, 28
U.S.C. S 2412(dX1XAX1988)).
75. 110 S. Ct. 2447 (1990).
76. 111 S. Ct. 922 (1991).
77. "[Ain appellate court should apply an abuse-of-discretion standard in reviewing all
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filing, and that the applicable standard is one of reasonableness
under the circumstances.."78 The case may disadvantage environ-
mental plaintiffs in several ways. Individual litigants may lack
access to factual data located on private property owned by
environmental defendants. They may also have limited resources
for gathering information that is available and, thus, may appear
to violate Rule ll's mandates governing prefiling factual inves-
tigations. Because a number of lawyers apparently encounter
problems understanding the complex statutory schemes that un-
derlie most environmental cases, lay persons could well experi-
ence difficulty complying with the Court's prescription regarding
legal inquiry.
Moreover, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 requires that
litigants sign applications for Temporary Restraining Orders
(TROs), 79 orders that many environmental plaintiffs seek, for
example, to halt imminent activity that they believe will irre-
trievably harm the environment. 80 Dissenting in Business Guides,
Justice Kennedy cogently observed that "one may expect reti-
cence to seek temporary restraining orders since the time pres-
sures inherent in such situations create an acute risk of sanctions
for unreasonable prefiling inquiry."'S Furthermore, the majority,
by expanding plaintiffs' exposure to liability for attorneys' fees,
could effectively frustrate congressional intent expressed in fee-
shifting provisions of most environmental statutes: prevailing
plaintiffs are ordinarily entitled to attorneys' fees and defendants
normally are not.8 2
aspects of a district court's Rule 11 determination." Cooter, 110 S. Ct. at 2461; see also
PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 2, at 7 (setting forth proposed advisory committee's note,
which retains identical standard).
78. Business Guides, 111 S. Ct. at 933; see also PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 2, at 4
(setting forth proposed Rule 11(cX2), which would provide that monetary sanctions may be
awarded against represented party only for violating improper purpose clause).
79. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b).
80. See, e.g., Maine Audubon Soc'y v. Purslow, 907 F.2d 265, 266 (1st Cir. 1990); Stein v.
Barton, 740 F. Supp. 743, 746 (D. Alaska 1990). See generally VICTOR J. YANNACONE ET AL.,
ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AND REMEDIES S 6:13 (1972 & Supp. 1988) (discussing TROs).
81. Business Guides, 111 S. Ct. at 941 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
82. See, e.g., National Wildlife Fed'n v. Consumers Power Co., 729 F. Supp. 62, 64-65
(W.D. Mich. 1989) (prevailing defendants are entitled to attorneys' fees only when they can
demonstrate that plaintiffs claim was frivolous or meritless); Consolidated Edison Co. v.
Realty Invs. Assocs., 524 F. Supp. 150, 152-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (denying attorneys' fees to
defendant absent frivolous claim by plaintiff); see also 33 U.S.C. S 1365(d) (1988) (Clean Water
Act fee-shifting provision); 42 U.S.C. S 7604(d) (1988) (Clean Air Act fee-shifting provision);
Jeffrey S. Brand, The Second Front in the Fight for Civil Rights: The Supreme Court,
Congress, and Statutory Fees, 69 TEX. L. REV. 291 (1990) (comprehensive analysis of Supreme
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In short, the assessment of formal Rule 11 activity in environ:
mental litigation reveals that judges and defendants have invoked
the provision infrequently against plaintiffs. Moreover, few courts
have found that plaintiffs contravened the Rule, and most that
did have been solicitous of the litigants' needs when selecting
appropriate sanctions. The dearth of formal Rule 11 activity that
has disadvantaged the plaintiffs makes analyzing informal activity
even more important.
C. Informal Rule 11 Activity
Ascertaining whether informal Rule 11 activity has negatively
affected environmental plaintiffs is problematic, primarily be-
cause it is difficult to detect and document, especially in ways
that support defensible conclusions. For example, it is impossible
to identify the number of individuals and groups that might have
pursued environmental litigation, had the threat of Rule 11 sanc-
tions not dampened their enthusiasm83 Correspondingly, attor-
neys may justifiably be reluctant to challenge or to reveal publicly
informal judicial application that has disadvantaged them, lest
the lawyers jeopardize relationships with judges before whom
they must appear in the future.84
Some evidence, which is principally anecdotal, indicates that
considerable Rule 11 activity that has disadvantaged civil rights
plaintiffs and attorneys the most has been informal. Troubling
examples have been judicial threats in chambers to sanction
litigants and lawyers who wish to pursue claims that the judges
find marginal and the imposition of large assessments in unpub-
lished opinions.s At the outset of this study, the idea that
analogous activity might be similarly affecting environmental
plaintiffs and practitioners seemed plausible.
Court's fee-shifting jurisprudence). See generally 3 FRANK P. GRAD, TREATISE ON EvmoN-
MENTAL LAW S 14.02 (1991) (discussing recovery of attorneys' fees under citizen suit
provisions); 2 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENvONMENTAL LAW: AiR AND WATn S 4.5, at 81-
82 (1986) (pointing out that a change in the dual standard for defendants and plaintiffs
would "dry up all but the open and shut litigation"); Tobias, supra note 13, at 312 & n.252
(discussing dual standard for shifting fees in civil rights cases).
83. See Alex Elson & Edwin A. Rothschild, Rule 11: Objectivity and Competence, 123
F.RD. 361, 365 (1988); Tobias, supra note 25, at 501-02; Vairo, supra note 3, at 200-01.
84. See Tobias, supra note 4, at 117 n.59.
85. See Tobias, supra note 25, at 502-03 & n.60; Tobias, supra note 4. at 117 n.59.
86. See Tobias, supra note 4, at 117 n.60 (discussing threats to sanction); Charles Presto,
Esq., statement at the Rule 11 Conference, School of Law, New York University (Nov. 2,
1990) (remarking that $63,000 sanction was levied in a case for which no opinion was
published).
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These hypotheses, therefore, were tested by interviewing many
attorneys for the plaintiffs and some defense counsel, who pri-
marily represent institutional litigants, such as the National Wild-
life Federation and the federal government. I interviewed directly
more than twenty-five lawyers who stated that they could speak
for several hundred additional attorneys with whom they work.8
The lawyers reported a low incidence of informal Rule 11
activity in environmental cases. Attorneys for environmental
defendants and judges seem to have employed the Rule somewhat
more frequently in informal contexts but to no worse effect for
the plaintiffs. These findings contrast sharply with the experience
of civil rights plaintiffs. Substantial formal and informal activity
has disadvantaged the plaintiffs, and informal activity may have
affected them more significantly.e
Lawyers who represent institutional plaintiffs stated that the
parties have encountered minimal informal Rule 11 activity, little
of which has detrimentally affected them.e The attorneys re-
ported that defense counsel only occasionally have threatened
orally to invoke Rule 11 or in the text or footnotes of motions
or briefs as a crude form of "finger-pointing." 90 The director of
a law school environmental law clinic remembered being "threat-
ened one time by a Justice Department attorney" in nine years
of litigating environmental cases.91 One lawyer associated with a
similar organization had experienced "no Rule 11 activity at all"
during the same period, while a professor who worked in a third
law school clinical setting over six semesters had "not seen
87. The reason that the lawyers with whom I spoke could speak for many others was
that they worked in rather large legal offices, such as the Department of Justice or the
Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund. I called the attorneys, identified myself, asked them about
their experiences with Rule 11 and those of any other environmental plaintiffs of which
they were aware, sought their views on why there was so little formal Rule 11 activity in
environmental (as opposed to civil rights) cases, and inquired whether they had experienced
any informal Rule 11 activity. The lawyers are identified only by numbers, because it
seemed appropriate to maintain confidentiality and to help preserve the attorneys' ongoing
relations with judges and lawyers with whom they will be involved in future litigation. See
supra note 84 and accompanying text. Most of the information reported below pertains to
informal Rule 11 activity, although some relates to formal activity.
88. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (indicating substantial quantity of formal
activity); Tobias, supra note 25, at 502-03 (discussing substantial quantity of informal activity
that disadvantages civil rights plaintiffs); Tobias, supra note 4, at 117-18 (same).
89. This statement is premised on telephone conversations with numerous attorneys
representing institutional plaintiffs (Mar-Apr. 1991). The reasons for the lack of negative
activity are reported in Part III of this Article.
90. This statement is premised on telephone conversations with numerous attorneys who
represent institutional plaintiffs WMar.-Apr. 1991).
91. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 1 (Mar. 14, 1991).
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anything in the Rule 11 area."' An attorney who has adminis-
tered an external clinic for eight years observed that lawyers
for defendants had "not threatened me with Rule 11 sanctions." 93
Attorneys responsible for two of the largest legal offices main-
tained by institutional environmental plaintiffs afforded similar
observations. Both of these lawyers stated that judges had never
granted Rule 11 sanctions against their organizations. 94 One at-
torney could recall only a single instance in which a motion had
been filed against the group and thought that Rule 11 was "not
being used very extensively informally" in environmental law-
suits.9 5
The lawyer for the other entity, which conducts more environ-
mental litigation than any of the national organizations, said that
the public interest litigant had "been, the subject of some Rule
11 motions."' ' He also circulated a memorandum to the other
twenty attorneys who work for the group seeking their perspec-
tives on Rule 11 activity.w
The results of that survey confirmed many of the propositions
stated above.98 The attorneys reported three instances in which
opposing lawyers had filed sanctions motions against the entity,
all of which were denied, and said that there was a low incidence
of informal Rule 11 activity in their cases, with defense counsel
often levelling informal threats to invoke the provision."
Attorneys who administer three other sizable offices, which
participate in somewhat less litigation, offered similar thoughts.1'
One of the lawyers stated that sanctions had never been sought
against the organization and believed that "strikingly little" Rule
11 activity of any kind was present in environmental cases.10 1
The second attorney remembered a "single Rule 11 motion" that
was filed against the litigant and that was "defeated pretty
92. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 2 (Mar. 14, 1991).
93. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 3 (Mar. 14, 1991).
94. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 4 (Mar. 14, 1991).
95. Telephone Interviews with Attorneys Number 5 and Number 6 (Mar. 14, 1991).
96. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 5, supra note 95.
97. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 6, aupr note 95.
98. Survey of lawyers conducted by Attorney Number 6 (copy on file with author)
[hereinafter Survey.
99. Id; Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 6, supra note 95. One of the motions
filed by an opposing lawyer was a response to the Rule 11 motion that the organization
ified against an environmental defendant and was one of a tiny number of motions that
plaintiffs filed. See infr note 108 and accompanying text.
100. Telephone Interviews with Attorneys Number 7 (Apr. 4, 1991) and Number 8 (Apr.
2, 1991).
101. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 7, supra note 100.
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handily,"'1 2 while the other lawyer had "not seen much Rule 11
activity" in the group's lawsuits. 103
Several other attorneys who are or were associated with in-
stitutional environmental plaintiffs and a few lawyers who are in
private practice provided similar information. For instance, most
of the attorneys recalled one or a very small number of cases in
which defense counsel moved for sanctions or suggested infor-
mally that they might invoke the Rule. 10 4 Attorneys for plaintiffs
correspondingly could remember virtually no circumstances in
which judges determined that environmental plaintiffs contra-
vened Rule 11.105
The perceptions of lawyers who have been involved in rather
controversial environmental litigation were not substantially dif-
ferent.0 6 One attorney, who enjoys a reputation as a tough, savvy
litigator and has participated in numerous suits over old growth
timber and the spotted owl in the Pacific Northwest, experienced
little informal Rule 11 activity in those cases.' ° The lawyer could
recall only one instance in which defendants invoked the Rule
against his client, and that situation involved a cross-motion filed
in response to the organization's request for Rule 11 sanctions. 0 8
An attorney who has brought a number of toxic tort suits
remarked that there had "not been much Rule 11 activity in my
cases."'1 9 Another lawyer who has pursued numerous toxic tort
actions had "not seen that many suits where plaintiffs have gotten
hit with Rule 11 sanctions" and observed that defense counsel
do "not even bring up Rule 11 formally in my cases."" 0 The
attorney added, however, that the "threat of Rule 11 is very
pervasive" and that he "never had been in a case where lawyers
don't talk about Rule 11" or invoke some form of counter-suit."'
A third attorney observed that he had "rarely seen any use of
102. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 8, supra note 100.
103. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 9 (Apr. 9, 1991).
104. Telephone Interviews with Attorneys Number 10 (Mar. 14, 1991), Number 11 (Mar.
14, 1991), and Number 12 (Apr. 4, 1991).
105. Telephone Interviews, supra note 104.
106. Telephone Interviews with Attorneys Number 13 (Apr. 2, 1991), Number 14 (Apr.
9, 1991), Number 15 (Apr. 9, 1991), Number 16 (Apr. 9, 1991), and Number 17 (Apr. 9, 1991).
107. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 13, supra note 106.
108. Id.; see also infra note 124 and accompanying text.
109. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 14, supra note 106. For helpful analysis
of toxic tort litigation, see Allan Kanner, The Evolving Jurisprudence of Toxic Torts: The
Prognosis for Corporaons, 12 CARnOZO L. Ray. 1265 (1991).
110. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 15, supra note 106.
111. Id.; see infra notes 244-47 and accompanying text (discussing use of countersuits as
an alternative to use of Rule 11).
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the Rule" in the litigation that he pursues.112 The lawyer made
this statement even though he has participated in all kinds of
environmental suits, including toxics cases, for fifteen years-as
counsel for local and national environmental groups and for
parties in the Exxon Valdez dispute-and has practiced primarily
in a federal district that generally experiences much Rule 11
activity.113
An attorney who represents industry members in considerable
toxic tort and CERCLA litigation believed that Rule 11 has been
employed more frequently in these than other environmental
cases, even though CERCLA actions "almost always settle and
it is very likely that a lot of Rule 11 motions come out in the
wash." 114 The lawyer added that in-house counsel for one large
company, which plaintiffs often sue in asbestos cases, routinely
responds to "complaints by sending Rule 11 letters [which] result
in most actions being dropped or withdrawn." 5
One attorney who has brought numerous citizen suits seeking
enforcement under the Clean Water Act could recall several
situations in which defendants resorted to the Rule but was "not
aware of any case where a Rule 11 motion was granted."" 6 A
second lawyer who has litigated many similar actions stated that
there was "finger-pointing by defendants in briefs filed in a
number of cases but the parties never formally pursued Rule 11
with the courts.""17 The attorney remembered one instance in
which defendants argued to the judge that the plaintiff's "pre-
complaint activity violated Rule 11"; however, the court found
the contention so "frivolous that it merited no attention.""' 8
A lawyer who has filed more than fifty citizen suits under the
Clean Water Act observed that defense counsel frequently raise
Rule 11 but that reliance on the provision is "more tactical than
substantive.""19 The attorney stated that Gwaltney of Smithfiwld,
112. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 16, supra note 106.
113. Id.
114. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 17, supra note 106.
115. Id.
116. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 18 (Apr. 2, 1991). For a comprehensive
analysis of citizen suits, see Barry Boyer and Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Reguatory
Enforcement. A Preliminary Assesment of Citizen, Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws,
34 BuFF. L. REv. 833 (1985).
117. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 19 (Apr. 5, 1991).
118. Id.
119. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 20 (Apr. 5, 1991).
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Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundati 12 "generated enormous prac-
tice on pretrial issues" in Water Act enforcement litigation and
that defense counsel regularly allude to Rule 11 when filing
pretrial motions.'?' The lawyer recalled one citizen suit in which
a district court imposed a $5000 sanction on a public interest
litigant for "failing to perform sufficient legal inquiry," because
the group pursued an action that the judge believed that Gwalt-
ney barred.122
Few attorneys who represent environmental plaintiffs men-
tioned invoking Rule 11 against environmental defendants, 12a and
a small number of practitioners expressly stated that it is not a
provision that the plaintiffs use.?A4 Several of the lawyers did
say, however, that they would not hesitate to file motions if
defense counsel "crossed the line."'' 1 Moreover, one attorney
actually sought Rule 11 sanctions in controversial litigation in-
volving timber practices in the Northwest, when the opposition
requested that the court modify an injunction for the third time
and tendered "demonstrably false information.'"
The incidence of informal judicial activity involving Rule 11
appears to be considerably smaller. The lawyers reported that a
minuscule number of courts had threatened to sanction plaintiffs
if they continued the pursuit of counts that the judges thought
lacked merit, although virtually no courts levied awards against
the parties in unpublished decisions.'2 Typical was the observa-
tion of one lawyer who stated that no judge has "threatened me
120. 484 U.S. 49 (1987). The Gwaltney opinion alludes to the possibility that Rule 11
justified the Court's disposition, but the opinion does not speak directly to the Rule's
application. Id. at 65.
121. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 20, supra note 119. The majority in
Gwaltney prohibited citizen suits for past violations, thus triggering considerable litigation
over the timing of violations. See Beverly McQueary Smith, The Viability of Citizens' Suits
Under the Clean Water Act After Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 40
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1 (1989-90).
122. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 20, supra note 119. The case was
Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Avtex Fibers, Inc., Civ. Act. No. 87-39E (W.D. Pa.
Dec. 16, 1988). See supra note 27.
123. This conclusion is based on telephone conversations with numerous environmental
attorneys (Mar.-Apr., 1991).
124. Telephone Interviews with Attorneys Number 9, supra note 103, and Number 12,
supra note 104.
125. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 13, supra note 106; Survey, supra note
98.
126. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 13, supra note 106.
127. This conclusion is premised on telephone conversations with numerous attorneys
(Mar.-Apr., 1991). The only unpublished opinion of which I am aware is mentioned above at
notes 27, 122 and the accompanying text. The incidence was much lower than in civil rights
cases. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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with Rule 11 sanctions" in eight years of litigating environmental
cases.m
In short, there has been a clear paucity of formal, and an
apparent dearth of informal, Rule 11 activity in environmental
lawsuits. Although this relative inactivity makes it difficult to
draw definitive conclusions or to make generalizations that apply
to different contexts, analysis of Rule l1's implementation in
environmental cases yields instructive insights on modern civil
litigation. For instance, it shows why judges and parties eschew
reliance on the provision and invoke alternatives in environmental
suits, even as they vigorously employ the Rule in certain forms
of modern litigation. Moreover, the Rule 11 activity that has
occurred supports credible hypotheses that warrant comparison
with those derived from studying other forms of civil litigation.
The propositions can also be tested by collecting, assessing, and
synthesizing the type of information, such as that on informal
Rule 11 activity, which I have previously suggested should be
assembled and analyzed.129 The third Part of this Article, there-
fore, examines the consequences of Rule 11 activity in environ-
mental cases.
III. IMPLICATIONS AND LESSONS
A. Why Has There Been So Little Rule 11 Activity?
Many plausible reasons explain the dearth of Rule 11 activity
in environmental litigation. These explanations enhance appreci-
ation of environmental plaintiffs and defendants, of those lawyers
who pursue the cases and of judges who hear the suits, and of
the litigation itself, while informing understanding of the contem-
porary legal culture in the federal courts.
1. Environmental Litigants and Attorneys
Numerous apparent reasons exist for the limited amount of
Rule 11 activity in environmental lawsuits. One important cluster
of explanations relates to the identities of the parties and attor-
neys who are involved in much environmental litigation and their
respective resources for participating. Many plaintiffs, typically
governmental or public interest entities, and a number of defen-
128. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 3, supra note 93.
129. See Tobias, supra note 25, at 522-23; Tobias, supra note 4, at 125.
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dants, generally governmental or regulated interests, are "insti-
tutional litigants"; most of them have considerable time and
energy as well as some specialized expertise and enjoy favorable
ongoing relations with the judiciary.130
a. Institutional Environmental Plaintiffs and Attorneys
(1). The Government as Environmental Plaintiff
The federal government, when determining whether to file
papers and preparing the relevant documents once it decides to
file, relies on elaborate review procedures and draws on substan-
tial policy, legal, and technical expertise.131 The government usu-
ally employs a multitiered, interdisciplinary decisionmaking
process, especially when considering a complaint, the document
that courts sanction most frequently.
Policymakers, technical experts, and lawyers in an agency
contemplating suit-such as the Environmental Protection Agency,
(EPA); attorneys from the Environment and Natural Resources
Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ), which possesses
primary governmental responsibility for litigating environmental
cases; and the United States Attorneys' Offices, which have local
litigating authority-thoroughly review the relevant public pol-
icy, technical, and legal factors, including the prospects for suc-
cess. If those decisionmakers conclude that papers should be
filed, numerous individuals help prepare the documents.
Lawyers in the DOJ and in the United States Attorneys'
Offices work closely with their counterparts in the responsible
agency, such as the EPA's Office of General Counsel, and with
the agency's technical experts, such as wildlife biologists and
engineers. The attorneys carefully research and develop the legal
theories that underlie the papers, while the policy and technical
personnel collect, analyze, and synthesize supporting factual in-
130. That is, in comparison with individual civil rights plaintiffs and attorneys. See
generally ARON, supra note 21 (discussing public interest litigants as institutional litigants);
SCHcCK, supra note 21 (discussing government as institutional litigant); Boyer & Meidinger,
supra note 116 (discussing continuing relations); Tobias, supra note 25, at 495-98 (discussing
resources of civil rights plaintiffs and attorneys); Symposium, Law, Private Governance and
Continuing Relationships, 1985 Wis. L. RE V. 461-757 (same).
131. I rely substantially in this Part of the Article on my experience as a legal consultant
for the Food and Drug Administration Office of General Counsel and as a lawyer in private
practice working with the Environmental Protection Agency in several proceedings and
pieces of litigation, on telephone conversations with a number of government attorneys
(Nov. 14, 1990), and on in-person conversations with several government attorneys (Nov. 3,
1990). See generally Robert L. Stern, "Inconsistency" in Government Litigation, 64 HARV. L.
REv. 759 (1951) (exploring government attorneys' representation of the government).
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formation. All of these individuals help to write drafts, which
are circulated to persons in the various offices having policy,
legal, and technical expertise for criticisms and suggestions, es-
pecially regarding legal and factual accuracy. The ideas secured
are assimilated in revising the documents and in developing final
drafts of the papers for filing.
Many attorneys in the DOJ, the United States Attorneys'
Offices, and the client agencies have accumulated extensive ex-
perience in the environmental law field or in litigating environ-
mental cases, and a number of the lawyers are very familiar with
the applicable substantive statutes or even have participated in
drafting or implementing the measures. Numerous technical per-
sonnel possess analogous specialized knowledge in their particular
areas of expertise and have significant time and money to gather,
assess, and synthesize the requisite information for completing
reasonable prefiling investigations of the facts. If they do not
satisfactorily finish this task, the attorneys have sufficient ex-
pertise and resources to insure that the work is properly con-
cluded, to research and formulate defensible legal theories, and
to conduct reasonable prefiling inquiries into the law.
A lawyer who is now in private practice but once served as a
high-level official in the Environment and Natural Resources
Division, offered an example that aptly summarizes the proposi-
tions examined above.3 2 He stated that in "environmental tort-
type litigation, the Justice Department employed storybook, not
notice, pleading and filed complaints that were premised on a lot
of research, included lots of allegations, were very substantial,
and were never vulnerable to motions to dismiss."'' The lawyer
added that the government "spends much money on waste re-
porting and investigations" and that the major environmental
statutes impose "significant monitoring and reporting require-
ments" on regulated interests, so that the DOJ can secure con-
siderable factual data before filing.134
(2). The Public Interest Litigant as Environmental
Plaintiff
Most of these ideas apply, perhaps somewhat less pervasively,
together with numerous additional propositions, to public interest
132. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 21 (Apr. 9, 1991).
133. Id.
134. Id-
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litigants.13 5 For instance, entities such as Defenders of Wildlife
and the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) rely on
multilayered, interdisciplinary procedures in determining whether
to file papers and in preparing the documents that they ultimately
submit.136
The organizations employ numerous staff attorneys who pos-
sess much relevant specialized expertise, having practiced envi-
ronmental law exclusively for many years.'3 Indeed one former
assistant administrator of the EPA stated that the "environmen-
tal bar that brings suit for the national litigants is very sophis-
ticated legally and [is] not likely to make big legal or factual
mistakes or errors in judgment."' 8 A former high-level lawyer
in the agency similarly remarked that attorneys for the "groups
are much too good to advance legal theories that would get them
into Rule 11 trouble.'1
The lawyers, as staff attorneys, identify closely with the public
interest litigants. The lawyers are acutely aware that the need
to resist Rule 11 motions and to pay any sanctions assessed can
have potentially damaging impacts on organizational morale and
finances, so they exercise great care in deciding to tender papers
and in preparing them. For instance, a lawyer who represents
one of the major groups said, "frankly, we don't have the re-
sources to bring questionable or frivolous litigation."' 40 Corre-
spondingly, environmental public interest entities, such as the
Environmental Defense Fund, have rather large in-house staffs
including engineers and scientists with substantial particularized
knowledge in technical fields that are crucial to environmental
litigation.'4 '
Although most of these organizations possess more resources
than a number of private individuals, the public interest litigants
have considerably fewer funds than the government,42 which
135. I rely substantially in this part of the Article on my experience as a lawyer working
for and against public interest litigants and on the telephone interviews, supra notes 87-
128. See generally ARON, supra note 21 (providing background description of public interest
law and lawyers).
136. This assertion is premised principally on my knowledge of the legal staffs of the
National Wildlife Federation, the NRDC, and the Sierra Club, gleaned from working for
the Federation in one of its law school clinics and against NRDC in a number of proceedings,
and from the telephone interviews. See supra notes 87, 89-97, 99-119, 121, 123-128.
137. Id.
138. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 22 (Apr. 5, 1991).
139. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 17, supra note 106.
140. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 9, supra note 103.
141. Cindy Vreeland, Comment, Public Interest Groups, Public Law Litigation and Federal
Rule 24(a), 57 U. Cm. L. Ray. 279, 295-303 (1990).
142. See supra note 25.
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means that the groups must maximize the benefit derived from
the time and effort spent on litigation. This relative dearth of
resources and other factors, such as the large quantity of envi-
ronmental lawsuits that could be brought, make the entities
extremely selective about the cases that they file.
The organizations carefully choose the litigation that the groups
are most likely to win, that will have the greatest impact, and
in which they will be able to recover attorneys' fees. One lawyer
in private practice observed that the entities "know that they
are not playing with someone else's money and that if the
organizations are going to be paid they must win," while the
groups "will not waste the time if they will not get paid."'143 A
former EPA assistant administrator claimed that the national
entities may even refuse to "take hard cases where the proof is
difficult, because there are so many easy ones in which they will
be sure to get attorneys' fees awards."'144
Institutional public interest litigants have successfully settled
or won much of the litigation that they have filed, at least in the
lower federal courts.145 Indeed, numerous attorneys who repre-
sent the organizations and other lawyers recited in mock seri-
ousness the following litany: the lack of Rule 11 activity in
environmental cases is attributable to the careful prefiling work
of plaintiffs' attorneys, as demonstrated by their success on the
merits.146
(3). Similar Characteristics of Institutional Environmental
Plaintiffs
Many institutional plaintiffs and their lawyers seem to enjoy
relatively congenial, ongoing relations with judges-rapport that
143. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 16, supra note 106.
144. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 22, supra note 138; cf. John C. Coffee,
Jr., Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private
Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 669 (1986)
(discussing attorneys' financial incentives and disincentives for litigation).
145. The high success rate in the major category of environmental litigation that chal-
lenges agency regulatory action or inaction is substantially attributable to the unrealistic
temporal deadlines that Congress imposes on the agencies. See, e.g., Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Citizens for a Better Env't v.
Costle, 610 F. Supp. 106 (N.D. nM. 1985). But cf. RODGERS, supra note 82, S 4,6, at 88
(observing that environmental plaintiffs usually lose in the Supreme Court). See generally
GAIL BnNGHAM, RESOLVING ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES: A DECADE OF EXPERIENCE (1985)
(analyzing resolution of environmental controversies, especially through alternative dispute
resolution).
146. Telephone Interviews with Attorneys Number 2, supra note 92, Number 5, supra
note 95, Number 7, supra note 100, Number 9, supra note 103, and Number 13, supra note
106.
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can be ascribed principally to the status of the parties and
attorneys as repeat players who apparently have earned judges'
respect for the quality of their work.147 For example, in numerous
federal districts, one Assistant United States Attorney is re-
sponsible for handling all environmental cases.14 The United
States Attorneys' Offices must also cultivate and retain good
relations with judges before whom their lawyers appear daily.
Moreover, many federal judges actually are former United States
Attorneys or worked in the Offices as assistant prosecutors and,
thus, should be intimately familiar with the high professional
standards that prevail in most Offices. 49 Correspondingly, a single
NRDC lawyer, who monitors EPA implementation of the Clean
Water Act and attempts to secure agency compliance with stat-
utory commands, may pursue numerous lawsuits against the EPA
in the identical court or make multiple appearances before the
same judge. 1s
Analogous elements are at work when public interest organi-
zations intervene on behalf of the government-as the groups do
in much litigation that regulated industries bring and in a number
of cases that the government files -and even when public interest
litigants sue the government. 5' Public interest entities, the gov-
147. See Symposium, supra note 130 (discussing effects of continuing relations); Marc
Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead. Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9
LAW & Soc'y REV. 95, 97 (1974) (classifying parties as '"repeat players").
148. Similarly, lawyers in DOJ's Environment and Natural Resources Division may be
responsible for certain substantive categories of litigation, such as that involving air quality
or public lands, or for litigation arising from specific regions of the country, such as the
Ninth Circuit.
149. Of the 774 federal district judges currently on the bench, 175 have worked as United
States Attorneys or Assistant United States Attorneys. Search of Westlaw, AFJ (Almanac
of the Federal Judiciary) file (Sept. 26, 1991); see JEROME R. CovsI, JUDICIAL POLITICS-AN
INTRODUCTION 140 (1984) (administrations other than Carter's turned heavily toward United
States Attorneys for district court appointees); see also ALAN NFF, THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT JUDGE NOMINATING COMMISSIONS: THEm MEMBERS, PROCEDURES AND CANDIDATES
122 (1981) (citing survey of Carter administration nominees for district judgeships that
revealed that many had prosecution experience in federal courts).
150. This situation obtained, for example, in the 1970's when NRDC was monitoring EPA
implementation of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 and
successfully challenged much EPA action or inaction in the District of Columbia District
Court. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 396 F. Supp. 1386 (D.D.C.)
(J.G. Speth, attorney), affid sub nom. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 564
F.2d 573 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (same); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 396 F.
Supp. 1393 (D.D.C. 1975), af'd, 568 F.2d 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (same).
151. Environmental litigation, especially challenges to agency regulatory action, has
increasingly assumed a tripolar party structure, involving the government, public interest
litigants, and regulated interests. See, e.g., Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action,
480 U.S. 370 (1987); United States v. South Fla. Water Management Dist., 922 F2d 704
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ernment, and the attorneys who work for these institutions have,
and recognize the need to maintain, comparatively cordial rela-
tions with one another. Both sides, therefore, are loath to seek
Rule 11 sanctions, lest the Rule's invocation raise the stakes in
specific controversies and jeopardize relationships involving or-
ganizations with which they must litigate many future environ-
mental disputes.152
These factors significantly increase the likelihood that the
papers that government and public interest litigants, as plaintiffs,
submit in environmental cases actually are, or appear to be,
preceded by reasonable legal inquiries and reasonable factual
investigations, well considered, fully tested for accuracy, properly
grounded in fact, and legally warranted. The considerations have
limited the amount of Rule 11 activity in environmental litigation
and plaintiffs' concomitant vulnerability to sanctions.
(4). Civil Rights Plaintiffs and Attorneys Contrasted
Most of the circumstances above appear attributable primarily
to the institutional character of environmental plaintiffs and to
the ways that their lawyers represent the entities. Indeed, courts
have sanctioned relatively few institutional plaintiffs, such as the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP) and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), or
their counsel in civil rights cases,15 despite the high incidence of
(11th Cir. 1991); Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Hodel, 866 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1989). See generally
Carl Tobias, Standing to Intervene, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 415 (discussing intervention of right
under Rule 24(aX2) and party structure in public law litigation).
152. One lawyer for a public interest litigant observed that the "organization litigates
against the government across the country and that both sides are concerned about
maintaining their ongoing relationships and would be reluctant to disrupt them with Rule
11." Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 13, supra note 106.
Certain considerations similar to those discussed in the text also may obtain when
"noninstitutional" plaintiffs, such as victims of exposure to toxic'chemicals, pursue toxic
tort litigation. I spoke to relatively few attorneys who participate in such litigation. One of
the lawyers did say, however, that the plaintiffs he represents "conduct well tests and soil
samples before anyone is willing to file suit" and collect the "information that they need
to prove their cases up front." See also supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text (attorney's
observations as to DOJ apply equally to his clients); supra notes 110-11 and accompanying
text (views of another lawyer who pursues toxic tort litigation).
153. See, e.g., NAACP-Special Contribution Fund v. Atkins, 908 F.2d 336 (8th Cir. 1990);
cf. Blue v. United States Dep't of the Army, 914 F.2d 525, 549-50 (4th Cir. 1990) (vacating
trial judge's order prohibiting NAACP Legal Defense Fund from paying sanctions imposed
on Julius Chambers for participation in litigation that preceded his assumption of post as
NAACP Executive Director), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1580 (1991). Of course, the imposition
of one large sanction on a public interest litigant can chill the enthusiasm of these litigants.
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Rule 11 activity in those lawsuits mentioned throughout this
Article.
The conditions that exist for a number of civil rights plaintiffs,
particularly individuals or "noninstitutional" litigants, contrast
markedly with those of many environmental plaintiffs.'1  Most
compelling may be the significant resource disparities that exist
between numerous civil rights attorneys and plaintiffs on the one
hand and environmental lawyers and plaintiffs, as well as cor-
porate or governmental counsel and litigants, on the other.
The civil rights bar consists principally of solo practitioners, a
number of whom may possess rather limited time, money, and
experience. The lawyers have difficulty absorbing the "front-end"
costs of litigation and depend substantially on fee shifting for
their compensation. 1 5 Most of the attorneys have few resources
for performing extensive legal research, developing creative legal
theories, and conducting comprehensive factual investigations in
the unusual instances when they have access to pertinent mate-
rial.16 Certain lawyers might possess somewhat narrow expertise,
because civil rights cases constitute an insignificant component
of their practices.
Recent Supreme Court opinions implicating much civil rights
law, whose effects are now being manifested in the lower federal
courts, may have diminished additionally the rather small pool
of civil rights attorneys with substantial experience. For instance,
during the mid-1980's, the Court interpreted two Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure together with the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Awards Act of 1976 (Fees Act)157 in ways that apparently have
complicated the efforts of civil rights lawyers to recover attor-
neys' fees.16
See Avirgan v. Hull, 705 F. Supp. 1544 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (imposing a $1,034,381.36 sanction
on public interest litigant), aft'd, 932 F.2d 1572 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 60 U.S.L.W.
3467 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1992). To detect exactly how much sanctioning involves institutional
litigants is difficult. For instance, the ACLU, the NAACP, and the Sierra Club may be
representing local affiliates or individuals, and their representation rarely can be discerned
from the captions and text of cases.
154. This part of the subsection relies substantially on Tobias, supra note 25, at 495-98.
155. Id. at 496 n.41.
156. Id at 497.
157. 42 U.S.C. S 1988 (1988).
158. See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986) (Rule 23(e)); Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1
(1985) (Rule 68); Spencer v. General Elec. Co., 894 F.2d 651, 661-64 (4th Cir. 1990) (example
of problematic application of Rule 68 by lower federal court); Phillips v. Allegheny County,
869 F.2d 234, 235-40 (d Cir. 1989) (same as to Rule 23(e)); see also Brand, supra note 82
(providing comprehensive analysis of Supreme Court's fee-shifting jurisprudence) infir
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Numerous civil rights lawyers have reputations as vigorous,
and frequently contentious, advocates for the individuals whom
they represent. A number of the attorneys view civil rights
actions in federal court as the only realistic recourse available
to persons who, for example, have no jobs because they were
victims of employment discrimination, or have been languishing
in prisons, because they were deprived of constitutional rights.
Some of the lawyers may zealously take on their clients' cases
as "causes" or to vindicate what they believe are significant
political, social, moral, or economic principles.
Few potential civil rights plaintiffs, especially those who would
pursue cases individually, rather than as members of institutional
litigants or as participants in class actions, can offset these
circumstances, particularly the financial difficulties. Most persons
who could sue have little access to, and minimal resources for
collecting and evaluating, data that are significant to completing
prefiling factual investigations that appear reasonable. 159 Numer-
ous potential litigants may not know what facts or legal elements
they must allege to make out a civil rights claim. They may even
be unaware that their constitutional or statutory rights were
violated. Several of these considerations mean that practically no
civil rights plaintiffs and comparatively few civil rights attorneys
have continuing or harmonious relations with federal judges,
particularly in contrast with institutional litigants and lawyers
who participate in civil rights and environmental litigation.
These factors can make the papers that civil rights plaintiffs
and their counsel file look as if they were preceded by deficient
legal inquiries or factual investigations or were not well-grounded
factually or warranted legally. These considerations also help to
explain the substantial quantity of Rule 11 activity in civil rights
cases and the corresponding susceptibility of plaintiffs to being
sanctioned.
b. Institutional Environmental Defendants and Attorneys
The institutional nature of many environmental defendants and
the perspectives of the liwyers who represent them also help to
notes 206-10 and accompanying text (discussing how Supreme Court and lower federal court
narrowing of much doctrinal civil rights law has exacerbated these developments in litigation
financing). See generally Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. & Neil Vidmar, Empirical Research on Offers
of Settlement. A Preliminary Report, 51 LAw & CoNTnmp. PROBs., Autumn 1988, at 13
(examining offers of settlement under Rule 68); Tobias, supra note 13, at 310-17 (discussing
the significance of judicial application of federal rules relevant to litigation financing for
public interest litigants).
159. Tobias, supra note 13, at 309.
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explain the rather low incidence of formal and informal Rule 11
activity in environmental lawsuits. Quite a few factors that are
relevant to this relative inactivity have been mentioned or alluded
to earlier in the Article.160
(1). The Government as Defendant
When an agency of the federal government is the defendant,
as happens in much environmental litigation that public interest
groups pursue, several important considerations substantially
limit the amount of Rule 11 activity. One significant element is
the governmental practice of seeking sanctions only in egregious
cases. Although this is not a formal, written policy of the DOJ
or of federal agencies, numerous lawyers who work for the Justice
Department, for the agencies, and for public interest organiza-
tions have stated that the government is very "conservative"
about filing Rule 11 motions and does so only when its opponents
have seriously abused the litigation process. 161 The practice may
reflect concern of the government and its attorneys about re-
stricting federal court access and the view that Rule 11 should
be reserved for special circumstances. 6 2
Numerous attorneys in the DOJ's Environment and Natural
Resources Division have considerable experience litigating envi-
ronmental cases, are comparatively insulated from political pres-
160. See, e.g., supra note 130 and accompanying text. Here I rely substantially on the
considerations mentioned supra notes 147-52 and accompanying text.
161. See Telephone and in-person conversations, supra note 131; Telephone Interviews
with Attorneys Number 7, supra note 100, and Number 10, supra note 104. This may soon
change, however, with the issuance by President Bush of an Executive Order that instructs
litigation counsel for the federal government to "take steps to seek sanctions against
opposing counsel and 'opposing parties where appropriate." Exec. Order No. 12,778 S l(f),
56 Fed. Reg. 55,195, 55,197 (1991).
162. The assertion regarding federal court access is controversial. For example, during
certain presidential administrations, lawyers in DOJ's Environment and Natural Resources
Division apparently asserted procedural technicalities, such as standing, to avoid reaching
the merits of a case. See, e.g., Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990);
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669 (1973);
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); see also Marianne Lavelle, Out of Bounds?, NAT'L
L.J., Dec. 9, 1991, at 1 (analysis of Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117 (8th Cir.
1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 2008 (1991), in which DOJ urged the Supreme Court to
impose unprecedented limitations on citizen standing to sue in environmental cases). See
generally Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. Cm. L.
REv. 494 (1986) (increased use of procedural technicalities to avoid adjudicating civil disputes).
For case law suggesting that Rule 11 be reserved for special circumstances, see Gaiardo v.
Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 483 (3d Cir. 1987); Szabo Food Service, Inc. v. Canteen Corp.,
823 F.2d 1073, 1085-86 (7th Cir. 1987) (Cudahy, J., dissenting), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 901
(1988).
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sure, are accustomed to defending the government against suit
by public interest litigants, and treat the agencies that they
represent as clients from which they maintain a healthy detach-
ment.'"3 These lawyers, the DOJ, and the agencies have and
appreciate the necessity of perpetuating good relations with many
environmental plaintiffs who will participate in future cases in-
volving the government. Moreover, governmental defendants are
not threatened personally or institutionally by most environmen-
tal litigation, which frequently includes relatively bland assertions
that an agency failed to comply with a congressionally imposed
deadline or misinterpreted a statute, and which seeks rather
mundane relief, such as promulgation of regulations by a specific
date.1
DOJ attorneys and the agencies that they represent thus have
few reasons for seeking sanctions from, and a number of disin-
centives to invoking Rule 11 against, environmental plaintiffs.
An attorney for environmental plaintiffs, whom the government
had not threatened with Rule 11 sanctions in eight years of
litigating, observed that there is "fairly high cordiality of gov-
ernment lawyers on natural resource issues," while Justice De-
partment attorneys are very business-like and are often more
"sympathetic to plaintiffs' cases than their own."165
(2). The Private Entity as Defendant
Even private environmental defendants, such as corporations,
are rather unlikely to file Rule 11 motions against environmental
plaintiffs. When the federal government or public interest liti-
gants, purportedly representing the public, have sued companies
over environmental degradation, the defendants may already be
worried about harm to their reputations. The corporations, there-
fore, may hesitate to seek sanctions, lest invocation of Rule 11
be perceived as a counterattack on these plaintiffs and generate
additional adverse publicity.
Institutions, not individuals, typically are the target of accu-
sations that their actions have damaged the environment. These
assertions currently carry less social stigma than allegations of
163. See Beth Nolan, Removing Conflicts from the Administration of Justice: Conflicts of
Interest and Independent Counsels Under the Ethics in Government Act, 79 GEo. L.J. 1, 41-
42 (1990) (categorizing government lawyers' employment agency as a client).
164. See, e.g., National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir.
1975); Citizens for a Better Env't v. Costle, 610 F. Supp. 106 (N.D. MI1. 1985).
165. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 3, supra note 93.
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discrimination. Numerous corporations may feel that they have
certain responsibilities to cooperate with government agencies
which generally attempt to implement complex environmental
statutes in good faith, and other companies could believe that
cooperation will be preferable for their reputations or their
balance sheets. Some of these concerns may lead a number of
corporations to "internalize" litigation costs-which could be
rather small, especially for companies with in-house counsel or
that can absorb the expense as a "cost of doing business"-rather
than rely on Rule 11 to recover the expenditures. 1'
Even when environmental defendants retain outside counsel,
as many corporations do, similar circumstances may pertain.
Numerous large law firms that represent a number of companies
have been reluctant to invoke Rule 11, requiring, for instance,
that attorneys or clients who wish to pursue sanctions secure
the approval of firm management committees.1 7 This reticence
partly reflects certain norms prevalent in the "legal cultures" of
many substantial firms. These norms include a desire to resolve
litigation on the merits and the wish to maintain harmonious,
continuing relations with federal judges as well as a distaste for
the unseemly appearance that might attend the filing of Rule 11
motions and the concomitant loss of credibility that could accom-
pany the denial of sanctions requests. 168 Some corporations and
certain of their counsel, either in-house or external, may prefer
to secure and maintain cordial relations with environmental plain-
tiffs who will participate in future environmental controversies
involving the companies.169
Finally, numerous governmental and private environmental
defendants might not seek Rule 11 sanctions because they think
166. Several attorneys for environmental plaintiffs observed that large consumer-oriented
corporate entities, such as Fortune 500 firms, probably consider the risk of adverse publicity
accompanying the filing of a Rule 11 motion to outweigh the advantage of any monetary
sanction that might be awarded. Telephone Interviews with Attorney Number 8, supra
note 100; Attorneys Number 10, Number 11, and Number 12, sup'ra note 104; cf. infra note
244 (noting that local or regional entities typically bring SLAPP suits).
167. See Carl Tobias, Reassessing Rule 11 and Civil Rights Cases, 33 How. L.J. 161, 175
(1990). Attorneys in these firms apparently have been more willing to invoke Rule 11 in
litigation involving insurers and corporations under CERCLA, because the financial stakes
are much higher. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text, infra note 204.
168. These ideas are based on conversations with numerous attorneys who practice
primarily in large cities. See generally MAnc GALANTm & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF
LAwYERs: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM (1991) (analyzing legal culture in
large law firms).
169. The companies and attorneys probably enjoy less cordial relations quantitatively
and qualitatively than those that obtain between the government and public interest
litigants. See supra notes 147-48, 160 and accompanying text.
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that the prospects for success would be minimal. The limited
likelihood of succeeding is attributable to a number of consider-
ations. Important factors are the quality of the legal work that
institutional environmental plaintiffs produce, including the rea-
sonable nature of prefiling inquiries that they conduct and the
thoroughly researched papers that they file, the relatively cordial
relations that many plaintiffs enjoy with judges, and the concom-
itant solicitude that judges exhibit for the plaintiffs. 170 Prior
failure also may have discouraged subsequent attempts to invoke
Rule 11. For example, environmental defendants could well have
concluded that employing the Rule was fruitless, given the few
sanctions motions that courts granted and the small amounts
judges awarded after 1983.171 This situation probably enhanced
the already substantial appeal of several relatively efficacious
alternatives to Rule 11.172 All of these considerations seemingly
have reduced the incentives of private defendants to seek sanc-
tions and may explain the low incidence of Rule 11 activity.
(3). Civil Rights Defendants and Attorneys Contrasted
Much stated in the previous subsection apparently applies to
an insignificant number of civil rights defendants and their law-
yers. The ideas probably pertain, for example, when plaintiffs
sue departments of the federal government for employment dis-
crimination. 73 Many attorneys in the DOJ Civil Division will be
equally familiar with defending the government, and be nearly
as detached from their clients, as numerous lawyers in the
Environment and Natural Resources Division.
Different factors, however, help to explain the high rate at
which many institutional defendants and their counsel invoke
Rule 11 in civil rights actions. States or localities have recently
become the defendants in considerable civil rights litigation against
the government.174 A number of these governmental units were
170. See supra notes 25-54, 147-50 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 31-57 and accompanying text.
172. See infra notes 239-57 and accompanying text.
173. Examples of this litigation are Cook v. Boorstin, 763 F.2d 1462 (D.C. Cir. 1985) and
Perez v. FBI, 707 F. Supp. 891 (W.D. Tex. 1988). But see Blue v. United States Dep't ol the
Army, 914 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1990) (largest employment discrimination class action litigation
ever filed against Army in which government recovered substantial Rule 11 sanctions), eert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 1580 (1991, Napier v. Thirty or More Unidentified Fed. Agents, 855 F.2d
1080 (3d Cir. 1988) (involving single plaintiff civil rights action in which government recovered
Rule 11 sanctions).
174. For recent examples of cases in which courts rejected Rule 11 motions that local
1992]
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previously sued rather infrequently and traditionally possessed
and allocated relatively few resources for litigating, much less
for paying judgments. These circumstances could have been ex-
acerbated by the significant quantity of civil rights litigation that
alleges intentional misconduct, which means that governments
may not be immunized from suit or be covered by insurance. 175
Moreover, the attorneys for many of the entities are compara-
tively unaccustomed to handling the cases and identify rather
closely with their clients, for whom they often serve as employ-
ees. Furthermore, many lawsuits name local governmental offi-
cials, such as police officers or elected officials, individually as
defendants and charge them with participating in deliberate
wrongdoing, such as racial or gender discrimination. 176 These
factors, especially the emotionally and politically charged nature
of the assertions that plaintiffs lodge and must prove, increase
the likelihood that judges or defendants will invoke Rule 11 and
may leave plaintiffs vulnerable to sanctions.177
2. Environmental Litigation and Civil Rights Litigation
a. Environmental Litigation
Certain inherent characteristics of most environmental litiga-
tion help to explain why there has been so little Rule 11 activity
in the cases. Much environmental law actually or apparently is
complex and dynamic, involving substantial, convoluted statutory
governmental entities filed, see Hughes v. City of Fort Collins, 926 F.2d 986 (10th Cir.
1991); Danese v. City of Roseville, 757 F. Supp. 827 (E.D. Mich. 1991); Tutton v. Garland
Indep. Sch. Dist., 733 F. Supp. 1113 (N.D. Tex. 1990). See generally ROBERT H. FREiLICH &
RICHARD G. CARLISLE, SECTION 1983: SWORD AND SHIELD (1983) (analyzing state and local
liability under civil rights statutes).
175. See ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDIsS, INSURANCE LAW § 5.3(f), 5A(d) (1988)
(noting that losses caused intentionally by insured not covered by liability insurance);
SHELDON H. NAH1OD, CIwI RIGHTS AND CxviL LIBERTIES LITIGATION §§ 8.06, 8.12 (Supp. 1990)
(discussing immunity defense and intentional misconduct); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 895B, C (1979) (restating law of state and local government immunity); WILLIAM
L. PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 5131 (5th ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988)
(same).
176. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985) (holding that civil rights plaintiff may
not recover attorney's fees from a state if a state employee, individually, is the losing
party); Arnold v. Board of Educ., 880 F.2d 305, 308 (11th Cir. 1989) (suing school officials in
individual capacities).
177. For recent examples of cases in which courts granted Rule 11 motions filed by state
or local governmental entities, see In re Kunstler, 914 F2d 505 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 1607 (1991); Cochran v. Ernst & Young, 758 F. Supp. 1548 (E.D. Mich. 1991);
Gutierrez v. City of Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1494 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
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schemes. 17 The legal theories that underlie numerous environ-
mental lawsuits correspondingly seem complicated or nontradi-
tional.
The Supreme Court is partially responsible for these conditions,
especially the complicated, rapidly changing appearance of the
environmental field. The Court infrequently addresses environ-
mental issues and may not even interpret a major environmental
statute during any specific Term. 79 When the Supreme Court
considers environmental questions, it may speak in ways that
are not dispositive and that leave open the applicability of en-
vironmental law in numerous doctrinal areas.1 80 The Court's lim-
ited treatment of environmental law means that much of the field
has been in flux and that the lower federal courts have assumed
primary responsibility for developing considerable environmental
law, although they have done so inconsistently. 8'
A number of environmental cases, particularly challenges to
administrative agency action, predominantly involve legal issues,
such as statutory interpretationa 82 Many of the questions impli-
178. See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
179. See, e.g., Vol. 111 S. Ct (no cases interpreting major environmental statute); Vol.
110 S. Ct. (no cases interpreting Clean Water Act or National Environmental Policy Act);
Vol. 108 S. Ct. (only one case interpreting a major environmental statute-the Clean Water
Act); cf. RODGERS, supra, note 82, S 4.6, at 91 (noting that with.one or two notable exceptions,
Supreme Court members are disinterested in or uninformed about water pollution). The
Court's recent willingness to impose hypertechnical procedural requirements on plaintiffs
pursuing a public lands case may evince the Court's heightened interest in the underlying
substance of environmental law. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990);
see also supra note 162.
180. See, e.g., Lujan, 110 S. Ct. 3177; Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay
Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987). See generally supra note 121 (stating that the Supreme
Court's opinion in Gwaltney triggered significant litigation over timing issues under the
Clean Water Act).
181. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 2528, 2531 & n.1 (1990)
(granting certiorari because of disagreement among circuits on Clean Air Act interpretation);
Gee v. Boyd, 471 U.S. 1058, 1060 (1985) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)
(urging that the Court should grant certiorari because "lower courts have long been in
disarray on what standard of review to apply to an agency's decision not to undertake an"
environmental impact statement under NEPA); ef. General Elec. v. Litton Indus. Automation
Sys., 920 F.2d 1415, 1422 n.10 (8th Cir. 1990) (split in district courts over whether private
party can recover attorneys' fees and costs incurred in bringing cost-recovery action under
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. S 9607(aX4)(B) (1988)), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1697 (1991). This inconsis-
tency is not surprising with 12 circuits interpreting complex issues that arise under
convoluted statutes and with the Supreme Court unable to resolve all of the inconsistencies.
See generally SAMUEL ESTREICHER & JOHN SEXTON, REDEFINING THE SUPREME COURT'S ROLE:
A THEORY OF MANAGING THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL PROCESS 52-59 (1986) (proposing criteria for
selecting cases in order to harmonize conflicts among federal circuits).
182. E.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984);
Consumer Fed'n of Am. v. United States Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 883 F.2d 1073
(D.C. Cir. 1989); Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. Thomas, 885 F.2d 918 (D.C. Cir.
1989).
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cated have not been definitively resolved or at least remain
sufficiently unclear that a broad spectrum of legal arguments
regarding them will seem plausible. These factors have compli-
cated the efforts of environmental defendants to convince judges
that plaintiffs pursued frivolous legal theories or failed to perform
reasonable prefiling legal inquiries and, thus, violated Rule 11.
In some environmental cases, the factual issues are inconse-
quential or clear-having been documented in an administrative
record, an agency's files, or a discharger's pollution reports-
while much information necessary to satisfy Rule 11 is easily
assembled or is accessible to environmental plaintiffs who can
afford to collect and analyze the data. For example, one form of
citizen suit which is principally pursued under the Clean Water
Act proceeds against regulated interests for violations of permit
conditions, is premised on noncompliance reports that the dis-
chargers submit to EPA, and is fairly described as "summary
judgment material."1s8 In a number of other cases that do involve
important, contested facts, information needed to satisfy Rule 11
will be in defendant's exclusive control and can be secured only
through discoveryls 4
Moreover, in most environmental litigation, the judiciary has
required little fact pleading of plaintiffs, applying the flexible,
pragmatic pleading regime that was a keystone of the original
1938 Federal Rules, a regime to which the Supreme Court sub-
scribed in the 1957 case of Conley v. Gibson.ss In numerous
183. See, e.g., Student Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 721 F. Supp.
604, 608 (D.NJ.), af'd me., 870 F.2d 652 (3d Cir.), and wodified on reconsideration, 727 F.
Supp. 876 (D.N.J. 1989); Student Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc. v. P.D. Oil & Chem.
Storage, 627 F. Supp. 1074, 1090 (D.N.J. 1986); see also Telephone Interview with Attorney
Number 22, supra note 138.
184. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text. See generally Tobias, supra note 25,
at 497-98 (outlining this specific difficulty and basic Rule 11 and evidentiary problems in
civil litigation).
185. 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); cf. infra note 195 and accompanying text (listing major
categories of cases in which only minimal pleading is required); Ascon Properties v. Mobil
Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1152-56 (9th Cir. 1989) (requiring minimal pleading of plaintiff property
owner in CERCLA suit). But see infra notes 209-10 and accompanying text (observing that
elevated pleading is required in civil rights cases). See generally Marcus, supra note 15, at
434-45 (discussing pre- and post-1938 history of pleading); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity
Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135
U. PA. L. REV. 909, 983-84 (1987) (same). The Court's recent willingness to impose hyper-
technical procedural requirements on plaintiffs pursuing a public lands case may be a sign
that the Court would reconsider flexible pleading. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110
S. Ct. 3177 (1990); cf Cash Energy, Inc. v. Weiner, 768 F. Supp. 892 (D. Mass. 1991)
(extending specificity of pleading requirements to CERCLA cases); Supporters to Oppose
Pollution, Inc. v. Heritage Group, 760 F. Supp. 1338 (ND. Ind. 1991) (holding that complaint
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remaining environmental lawsuits, plaintiffs have comprehen-
sively pled the facts.18 These considerations have made it difficult
for environmental defendants to persuade courts that plaintiffs
conducted deficient prefiling investigations into the facts or that
their papers were not well-grounded factually and, therefore,
contravened the Rule.
Additional intrinsic characteristics of environmental litigation,
pertaining both to prefiling legal inquiries and to factual inves-
tigations, explain the dearth of Rule 11 activity in the suits. In
nearly all environmental cases, there are numerous alternatives
to the Rule, such as resolution on the merits, the application of
which can be superior.lar The invocation of these options, partic-
ularly if successful, concomitantly complicates and even precludes
use of Rule 11.8 Many environmental lawsuits are so complex,
contested, or close that parties have no colorable argument for
the Rule's violation. 9
In much environmental litigation, the character of a plaintiff's
accusations, of the remedy sought, of the means of attaining relief
and of the judicial role are rather noncontroversial, 19° which can
be ascribed partly to the relatively low cost for defendants of
implementing the relief and of the litigation itself and to the
rather apolitical nature of the cases 91 For example, suits against
must include allegations respecting all material elements of all claims asserted; bare legal
conclusions attached to narrated facts are insufficient); Bradley Indus. Park v. Xerox Corp.,
No. 88 Civ. 7574(CSH), 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1492, at *31 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 1991) (declaring
it insufficient for notice pleading simply to track statutory language in conclusory fashion);
Cook v. Rockwell Intl Corp., 755 F. Supp. 1468, 1475 (D.'Colo. 1991) (same).
186. See supro notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
187. See infra notes 239-57 and accompanying text.
188. For example, it would be disingenuous for a defendant, who vigorously argued that
certain medical questions were so unclear that a physician should be precluded from offering
an opinion on them and that a plaintiff must prove a prima facie case as to them before
proceeding, to then assert that the issues were so clear that the plaintiff should not have
filed papers and thus violated Rule 11. See infra notes 242-43, 251 and accompanying text.
189. See, e.g., supra notes 178-81, infra note 197 and accompanying text (complex, close
legally); infra note 225 and accompanying text (complex, abstruse factually, legally, and
scientifically).
190. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv.
1281 (1976) (exemplifying classic treatment of judicial role in public law litigation). See
generally Resnik, supra note 13 (analyzing new judicial role in case management as a means
of controlling increasing caseloads).
191. The costs of implementation are relatively low for government defendants who
essentially "pass through" the expense to regulated interests. The United States Treasury
absorbs the government's litigation costs. Cf. infra notes 222-26 and accompanying text
(apolitical nature, supra notes 131-32, 162-65 and accompanying text (government as envi-
ronmental plaintiff and defendant). Government plaintiffs rarely have attempted to recover
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the government typically allege that agencies, as institutional
bureaucracies, missed statutory deadlines for promulgating pol-
lution control regulations or inadequately enforced existing ad-
ministrative rules, ask that agencies satisfy their obligations
within a certain time, and request that courts place the govern-
ment on compliance schedules.192 Because these constituents of
environmental disputes are comparatively noncontroversial, de-
fendants have little vested interest in the litigation or concomi-
tant incentive to seek sanctions.
In some environmental actions, time pressures, which are cre-
ated by the need for temporary relief to prevent imminent
environmental injury and by short statutory deadlines for filing
suit, can make plaintiffs' prefiling inquiries or the papers that
they submit appear deficient. 193 A few courts have considered
this acute lack of time relevant to plaintiffs' compliance with
Rule 11.'9
Certain characteristics examined already and others inhere in
significant, specific types of environmental cases. In one impor-
tant category of litigation involving challenges to considerable
agency decisionmaking, such as EPA rulemaking under the Clean
Water Act, Congress has expressly provided for plaintiffs to file
terse review petitions with the circuit courts.195 Because Congress
has demanded so little of the papers that plaintiffs tender, de-
fendants can hardly require more, and virtually no defendants
have sought Rule 11 sanctions from such plaintiffs. 196
or actually recovered attorneys' fees that they have incurred in environmental litigation.
See, e.g., United States v. MAV Zoe Colocotroni, 602 F.2d 12, 15 (lst Cir. 1979) (denying
attorneys fees to government in oil spill case). Some courts have stated that government
plaintiffs can recover attorneys' fees under CERCLA. See, e.g., United States v. Hardage,
750 F. Supp. 1460, 1511 (W.D. Okla. 1990); United States v. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615, 630-
31 (D.N.H. 1988); United States v. Northernaire Plating Co., 685 F. Supp. 1410, 1417 (W.D.
Mich. 1988), affd sub nom. United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497 (6th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1527 (1990). But f supra note 161 (Executive Order instructing
government counsel to seek sanctions when proper).
192. See, e.g., supra note 183 and accompanying text; supra notes 120, 150.
193. See, e.g., Maine Audubon Soc'y v. Purslow, 907 F.2d 265 (1st Cir. 1990) (involving
threat of imminent injury); see also supra notes 60-63, 80-81 and accompanying text.
194. See, e.g., Purslow, 907 F.2d at 268-69; see also supra note 61.
195. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. S 1369(bXl) (1988); accord Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
S 7607(bXl) (1988). See generally 1 FRANK P. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
S 1.05[21c] (1990) (describing statutory review of administrative agency actions); 16 CHARLES
A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE SS 3940-44 (1977 & Supp. 1991)
(discussing administrative review proceedings in a wide range of cases).
196. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
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A second major classification consists of citizen suits alleging
that the government failed to comply with a clear, mandatory
duty, or a debatable responsibility, that Congress imposed in
environmental legislation. 1' The obligations, which plaintiffs at
least can contend are arguable under the statutes, frustrate
attempts of defense counsel to show that the papers that plaintiffs
filed lacked legal or factual support or were not preceded by
adequate inquiries.
Even in the particular categories of environmental cases that
are more controversial, some intrinsic characteristics help to
explain why there have been more threats to invoke Rule 11
than have materialized into formal action. First, in the group of
Clean Water Act citizen suits whose resolution is less clear than
those described earlier,198 parties and attorneys have employed
the Rule primarily for tactical, not substantive, purposes.199
Second, many CERCLA cases settle, which means that most
Rule 11 activity "washes out." In a number of CERCLA actions
that do not settle, the minimal nature of certain jurisdictional
requisites-particularly the requirements for making potentially
responsible parties (PRPs) of entities that were not initially
implicated in creating or disposing of hazardous wastes-has
severely limited Rule l1's formal use.201
Third, in much toxic tort litigation, several characteristics of
pleading practice may have restricted reliance on Rule 11. The
quantity of legal, technical, and scientific material that many
plaintiffs secure before filing and their tendency to plead com-
prehensive factual allegations and traditional legal theories out
of concern about Rule 11 mean that plaintiffs' prefiling inquiries
and papers will appear to comply with the provision20 2 The
"boilerplate denials, lack of substantive information and laundry
list of defenses" that counsel for defendants include in answers
197. The classic example is agency failure to comply with a congressionally imposed
deadline for issuing regulations. See supra note 150; supra text following note 191; cf. supra
note 183 and accompanying text (another form of straightforward citizen suit).
198. See supra note 183 and accompanying text (describing such citizen suits); supra notes
116-22 (discussing suits whose disposition is less dear).
199. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
201. "If the government can make people PRPs on the basis of almost nothing, it is hard
to" impose more rigorous requirements on other litigants. Telephone Interview with Attor-
ney Number 17, supra note 106.
202. See supra notes 131-46 and accompanying text.
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probably have made them reluctant to invoke Rule 11, lest their
opponents pursue counter-motions. 203
In the specific classes of actions treated and in much additional
environmental litigation, when plaintiffs file suit, the infractions
of the defendants are clear, a circumstance that is partly attrib-
utable to the care with which many plaintiffs select cases, conduct
prefiling inquiries, and draft papers. These and numerous other
considerations above mean that relatively few environmental
actions will seem frivolous and that the suits comprise a small
percentage of the federal docket, so that the cases apparently
contribute minimally to the perceived litigation explosion. Thus,
insofarv as Rule 11 has been employed as a mechanism for com-
batting that explosion, courts have had little need to invoke the
provision in environmental suits. All of these factors seem re-
sponsible for the dearth of Rule 11 activity in environmental
litigation.24
b. Civil Rights Litigation Contrasted
In contrast, some inherent characteristics of civil rights liti-
gation may explain why so much Rule 11 activity has arisen in
these lawsuits. The cases often assert unpopular or novel legal
theories that are premised on complex, vague statutes or on
open-ended constitutional terms, such as "due process" and "equal
protection."'205
The Supreme Court has treated substantive civil rights law in
ways that appear definitive and that narrow its applicability in
203. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 21, supra note 132; see also PRELiNARY
DRAFT, supra note 2, at 2 (setting forth proposed Rule 11(b), which expressly subjects
defendants' papers to Rule's requirements).
204. The absence of these inherent characteristics may help to explain the rather high
incidence of Rule 11 activity in types of cases not defined as "environmental litigation" in
this Article and, thus, lend support to the ideas here. For example, in litigation between
companies and insurers involving the disposal and cleanup of toxic materials, the unclear,
controversial, sharply contested character of the allegations asserted, the substantial amount
of money at stake, and the great expense of litigating the cases may explain the elevated
level of sanctions motions filed. Compare these ideas with those supra note 191 and
accompanying text. See generally supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text (defining "envi-
ronmental litigation").
Even in litigation involving private defendants, some considerations similar to those in
the remainder of this subsection apply. For example, plaintiffs' allegations usually are lodged
against corporations as institutions, and plaintiffs ask judges to place defendants on
compliance schedules. Different considerations, however, do obtain in a number of suits.
See, e.g., Student Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, 913 F.2d
64, 80 (3d Cir. 1990) (finding $4,205,000 penalty could be appropriate for Clean Water Act
violation), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1018 (1991).
205. See BURBANK, supra note 10, at 68-72.
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many doctrinal areas.2 This evolution in the civil rights field
probably has led numerous appellate and district judges to con-
sider much of the law as clear or static.207 These factors have
made it relatively easy for civil rights defendants to persuade
courts that plaintiffs were pursuing frivolous legal theories or
had not conducted reasonable prefiling legal inquiries and had,
therefore, contravened Rule 11.
In many civil rights lawsuits, the factual issues are very
important or sharply contested, while much information necessary
to satisfy Rule 11 is difficult to secure or is in the minds or files
of defendants and, thus, is available only upon discovery. Even
when data needed for Rule 11 compliance are more accessible,
the material may be expensive to gather and evaluate. A number
of civil rights cases "test the limits" factually, involve information
that is not documented in writing, and can unravel factually.2 °
These difficulties are compounded by the rigorous pleading
regime that every circuit has now instituted for civil rights
litigation.2 9 The requirement that plaintiffs plead with specificity
demands more of the complaints that litigants file and, thus, can
make plaintiffs' pleadings and their prefiling inquiries seem in-
206. Many Supreme Court rulings of the 1988 Term involving substance, procedure, and
litigation financing epitomize these developments. See, e.g., Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755
(1989) (allowing challenge by white firefighters to hiring and promotion practices designed
to integrate force); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (requiring
plaintiffs to show direct link between statistical evidence and job discrimination claims
before suit can proceed on remand). Congress modified most of these rulings with the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, SS 105, 108, 138 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 5-8 to 5-9
(1991). See also infra note 209 and accompanying text (demonstrating that all federal circuits
now impose stringent pleading requirements on civil rights plaintiffs). See generally Steven
R. Greenberger, Civil Rights and the Politics of Statutory Interpretation, 62 U. CoLo. L.
Rv. 37 (1991) (arguing that the Court constricts legislative intent in its civil rights holdings);
Cassandra Butts et al., Comment, Reconstruction, Deconstruction and Legislative Response:
The 1988 Supreme Court Term and the Civil Rights Ad of 1990, 25 HARv. C.R,.CL. L. Rnv.
475 (1990) (criticizing the Court for restricting the ability to pursue civil rights suits); supra
note 158 and accompanying text (stating that the Court made it more difficult for civil
rights lawyers to recover attorneys' fees).
207. Courts so treat civil rights law, although it arguably resembles environmental law
in many respects. See infra note 219 and accompanying text.
208. See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 25, at 495-98; see also infra note 219.
209. See Hobson v. Wilson, 737 Fl2d 1, 29.31 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084
(1985); accord Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472, 1479-81 (5th Cir. 1985). A more recent example
is Arnold v. Board of Education, 880 F2d 305, 309-10 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that Rule 8
is applied more strictly in S 1983 cases). See generally Cash Energy, Inc. v. Weiner, 768 F.
Supp. 892 (D. Mass. 1991) (extending specific pleading requirements to CERCLA cases);
Douglas A. Blaze, Presumed Frivolous: Application of Stringent Pleading Requirements in
Civil Rights Litigation. 31 WM. & MARY L. Rzv. 935 (1990) (arguing that a rigorous standard
of pleading in civil rights actions is unnecessary and unjustifiable).
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adequate.210 These considerations have simplified the efforts of
civil rights defendants to show that plaintiffs submitted papers
that were not well grounded in fact or failed to undertake
reasonable factual investigations before filing and, therefore, vi-
olated the Rule.
Other intrinsic characteristics of civil rights lawsuits that per-
tain to prefiling legal inquiries and factual investigations may
explain the high level of Rule 11 activity in those cases. Civil
rights litigation is a capacious category of suits which spans a
broad spectrum.21' The litigation includes cases of individuals who
pursue monetary damages for workplace discrimination and class
action suits with thousands of parties and hundreds of issues
that seek fundamental reform of massive bureaucracies, such as
schools and prisons.212
Correspondingly, some actions denominated civil rights cases
are only nominally civil rights suits or should not even be so
classified, because counsel who file them merely append a civil
rights count to a claim that essentially involves another substan-
tive area.213 These civil rights counts can seem less well consid-
ered, while characterization of the cases as civil rights actions
may have artificially inflated the number of civil rights lawsuits
in which Rule 11 activity has .occurred.21 4
210. The rigorous pleading regime, thus, twice disadvantages civil rights plaintiffs. It
complicates their efforts to reach the merits and makes them more vulnerable to Rule 11
sanctions. See generaUy Tobias, supra note 13, at 304-08.
211. See BURDANK, supra note 10, at 69-70; CALL FOR COMMENTS, supra note 1, 131 F.R.D.
at 345.
212. See Tobias, supra note 13, at 279-82 (giving case examples and discussing the
litigation); see also Blaze, supra note 209, at 936-40 (analyzing litigation, especially as part
of federal docket, of. FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, 5 IC, at 2 (reporting that civil rights
cases represented approximately 10% of civil docket on average in five districts surveyed).
213. See Marcus, supra note 15, at 463. Indeed, even environmental plaintiffs pled civil
rights counts, especially prior to the advent of the major regulatory statutes. See, e.g.,
Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1981,
Garcia v. Cecos Int'l Inc., 761 F.2d 76, 82-83 (1st Cir. 1985). See genrally YANNACONE ET
AL., supra note 80, § 6:4.
214. At the Rule 11 public hearing held during February, 1991, several members of the
Advisory Committee were concerned about the amount of Rule 11 activity in civil rights
cases and asked the Federal Judicial Center to refine its recently collected data on the
cases. Telephone Interview with Thomas Willging, Deputy Research Director, Federal
Judicial Center (Feb. 26, 1991). Analysis of the case files for all civil rights actions in which
courts imposed sanctions in the five pertinent districts showed that plaintiffs' Rule 11
violations consisted principally of deficient prefiling legal inquiries, occasionally of inadequate
factual investigations, but rarely of papers filed for improper purposes. Moreover, judges
sanctioned few represented plaintiffs over the relevant three year period. Few of the cases
presented good faith arguments for change in the law or were the "Brown v. Board of
Education or Gideon v. Wainwright of the nineties." Thomas Wiliging, Statement at Advisory
Comm. Meeting, Washington, D.C. (May 23, 1991).
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In much civil rights litigation, the nature of the allegations
asserted, of the relief requested, of the means of achieving it,
and of the court's role are extremely controversial. These effects
are partially attributable to the comparative expense of the
litigation and of effectuating the relief as well as the litigation's
relatively political character. For example, in school desegrega-
tion cases, plaintiffs may accuse the local school board of racial
discrimination, ask the judge to enter a structural decree ending
segregation, and request that the court adopt a busing plan that
crosses the boundaries of several localities and that requires
active judicial oversight of the educational system for many
years.215
Other forms of civil rights litigation can be even more highly
charged. In employment discrimination cases, plaintiffs may claim
that specific managerial personnel discriminated on the basis of
race, age, or gender when hiring and promoting employees and
may ask that affirmative action measures be instituted to rectify
the alleged discrimination.216 In many civil rights actions, the lack
of a paper record, the complex, subtle, and subjective nature of
discrimination, and the difficulty of proving bias mean that the
suits devolve into swearing matches between plaintiffs who pas-
sionately assert that they suffered discrimination and defendants
who fervently deny any bias.
Civil rights cases may be the most emotional category of
federal civil lawsuit. The actions also can implicate political issues
that much environmental litigation simply does not. For example,
the accusation that an individual discriminated on the basis of
race or gender exposes the raw nerves of society in ways that
charging a company with air pollution cannot 17 Many civil rights
215. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Dowell, Ill S. Ct. 630 (1991); Missouri v. Jenkins, 495
U.S. 33 (1990). See generally BERNARD ScHwARTz, SwANN's WAY: THE SCHOOL BUSING CASE
AND THE SuPREME COURT (1986) (discussing the evolution of school desegregation cases
during the years of the Warren and Burger Courts).
216. See, e.g., Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989); Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v.
Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984). For a sense of the controversial nature of the relief sought in
such litigation, which can last for decades and involve many classes of litigants, see United
States v. Yonkers Board of Education, 927 F.2d 85 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 70 (1991)
and United States v. City of Chicago, 897 F.2d 243 (7th Cir. 1990). The costs of litigation
and implementing relief can be substantial.
217. This idea remains true even though advocates of vigorous civil rights enforcement
have sustained some recent setbacks in the area of doctrinal civil rights law. See supra
note 206 and accompanying text. See generally KRISTIN BUmLIR, THE CviW RIGHTS SOCIETY
(1988) (describing the emotion-filled personal civil rights encounters of the author's inter-
viewees and difficulties discrimination victims encounter in vindicating civil rights); Putting
Civil Rights on Au0omatic Pilot, WASH. POST NAT'L WKLY EDITION, Mar. 25-31, 1991, at 14.
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disputes are bitterly fought contests over matters of principle in
which plaintiffs seek to press the extremes of law, fact, or policy;
to challenge entrenched political or economic interests; or to
rectify intractable social problems through unpopular or untested
means.
The role of the judge in civil rights cases can be quite contro-
versial. Plaintiffs may request that the court expansively inter-
pret the open-textured provisions of the Constitution, divine
congressional intent from terse or ambiguous statutory phrase-
ology, intercede in the political decisionmaking of local elected
officials, or even order such officers to spend funds or face
contempt.218
Certain of these factors, such as the substantial emotional
stakes and the strong motivations for invoking Rule 11, increase
the likelihood that judges and defendants will employ Rule 11 in
civil rights litigation. Most of the factors can make the prefiling
legal and factual inquiries that plaintiffs perform and the papers
that they submit look deficient, thereby enhancing the plaintiffs'
susceptibility to sanctions.
Despite the discrepancies between Rule 11 activity in environ-
mental cases and in civil rights actions, the similarities between
these two types of actions are striking. For example, in both
kinds of litigation, plaintiffs plead novel legal theories, premise
their suits on complex, unclear statutes, litigate in areas of law
that are complicated and fast-changing, raise delicate questions
of federalism and judicial authority, lack access to facts important
for Rule 11 compliance, and experience time pressures in con-
ducting prefiling inquiries. Despite these commonalities, courts
seem to attach different, and often diametrically opposed, signif-
icance to analogous conditions in the cases. For instance, judges
apparently consider similar, nontraditional legal theories creative
when asserted in environmental suits but frivolous when alleged
in civil rights actions.219
3. The Federal Judiciary's Perceptions
The federal judiciary's apparently positive perceptions of, and
solicitude for, environmental lawyers, litigants, and cases also
218. See, e.g., Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33; Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 625 (1990).
219. See supra notes 30-37, 179-82, 208-09 and accompanying text. Some judges, in applying
Rule 11, recently have recognized certain difficulties that civil rights plaintiffs confront.
See, e.g., Hughes v. City of Fort Collins, 926 F.2d 986, 989-90 (10th Cir. 1991, Mareno v.
Rowe, 910 F.2d 1043, 1046-47 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 681 (1991, Kraemer v.
Grant County, 892 F.2d 686, 690 (7th Cir. 1990).
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seem important to the paucity of Rule 11 activity in environmen-
tal suits.220 For example, many judges appear to believe that
numerous attorneys, who represent environmental plaintiffs pos-
sess substantial expertise, and the judges often have cordial,
continuing relations with the lawyers and their clients.221 A
number of judges may be receptive to the individuals whom
environmental plaintiffs purportedly represent, to the substantive
interests that they attempt to vindicate, to the means of accom-
plishing the objectives that the plaintiffs seek, and to the ends
themselves.
Many judges seem to consider environmental actions as soci-
etally significant but view them differently from other cases that
implicate social welfare or "social regulation," namely civil rights
lawsuits. 2 These perceptual distinctions may be ascribed to quite
a few factors, such as the disparate nature of the allegations
asserted in, and the legal theories that underlie, the litigation.
The claim that an agency violated a regulation or even that a
corporation harmed an endangered species is simply less incrim-
inating and discomfiting to judges than the accusation that an
individual was convicted because of the person's race or religion.
Correspondingly, numerous courts seem more responsive to cases
that are grounded in clear statutory mandates than to those that
require judicial construction of the general provisions in the
Constitution.2 "
Moreover, comparatively few judges will be indifferent to the
charges of environmental degradation that are brought in many
environmental actions, especially disputes that involve a local
resource, such as an airshed or a river. A judge who lives in the
community2 breathes the very air or drinks the same water and
thus could be exposed to pollution but may never experience
discrimination.
Furthermore, a number of judges apparently consider many
environmental cases to be complicated, find daunting the abstruse
220. What is said in this subsection cannot be proved, because it speaks to perceptions
of judges. I rely upon what judges state in their opinions and what lawyers who practice
environmental law have said about judges, although neither source is totally reliable.
221. See supra notes 130, 147-52 and accompanying text.
222. "President Bush, who claims to be the environmental President," did appoint some
of the judges. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 15, supra note 106; cf. william
Lilley III & James C. Miller III, The New "Social Regulation", 47 PUB. INTEREST 49 (1977)
(discussing social legislation of which environmental statutes are a quintessential example).
223. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990).
224. See 28 U.S.C. S 134(b) (1988) (requiring each district judge, except those in the District
of Columbia, to reside in the district or districts for which he or she is appointed).
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factual, legal, scientific, and policy issues embedded in some suits,
and experience tremendous difficulty handling certain complex
aspects of the litigation 2 5 If courts encounter such a multitude
of problems resolving the cases, they could well be reluctant to
hold that attorneys and parties who pursue the actions contra-
vened Rule 11.226
Although the propositions above cannot be proved, most of the
ideas may be illustrated by contrasting them with many judges'
rather negative view of, and unresponsiveness to, civil rights
lawyers, plaintiffs, and litigation. One compelling indication is the
dramatic statistical disparity between Rule 11 activity in civil
rights cases and environmental suits. The federal judiciary has
issued approximately forty times as many published Rule 11
opinions in civil rights actions as in environmental cases.M An-
other telling sign is that civil rights plaintiffs are more than
twice as likely as other litigants to be sanctioned under Rule 11
in a number of federal districts.2
An unfavorable judicial perception of, or lack of solicitude for,
civil rights attorneys may be evidenced by recent determinations
that three of the country's highest profile civil rights lawyers-
Julius Chambers, William Kunstler, and Ramsey Clark-violated
Rule 11 in unrelated, controversial civil rights cases.229 Certain
judges apparently think that some members of the civil rights
bar lack substantive experience, and the judges may have me-
diocre or strained relations with the attorneys and none with
their clients.23°
225. See supra notes 31-39 and accompanying text.
226. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 15, supra note 106.
227. Approximately 500 civil rights cases and 14 environmental cases involving Rule 11
have been published. See supra notes 10, 26 and accompanying text. Civil rights plaintiffs
also are sanctioned at a higher rate than environmental plaintiffs. Compare Vairo, supra
note 3, at 200-01 with supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text and infra note 228 and
accompanying text.
228. Data collected from five federal district courts with computerized docket data indicate
that civil rights plaintiffs on the average are 2.6 times as likely to be sanctioned as other
litigants. See FiNAL REPORT, supra note 3, S 1C, at 3.
229. See Blue v. United States Dep't of the Army, 914 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1990) (affirming
lower court determination that Chambers violated Rule 11), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1580
(1991); In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505 (4th Cir. 1990) (affirming lower court determination that
Kunstler violated Rule 11), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1607 (1991); Satany v. Reagan, 886 F.2d
438 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (reversing lower court determination that Clark had not violated Rule
11), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2172 (1990). See generally Ruth Marcus, Rule 11: Does It Curb
Frivolous Lawsuits or Civil Rights Claims?, WASH. POST, Apr. 12, 1991, at A17 (discussing
the Chambers and Kunstler cases).
230. See supra notes 153-58 and accompanying text.
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A number of judges have been relatively unreceptive to many
civil rights cases.m l Several members of the Supreme Court,
which has recently narrowed much civil rights law, and numerous
lower federal court judges appear to believe that civil rights
actions as a category are more frivolous than other civil cases,
including environmental litigation.2 All of the circuits have now
relied partially on the notion that civil rights suits are less
meritorious to demand that civil rights plaintiffs plead with
particularity under Rule 8, although the provision's terms impose
no such requirement2 and neither empirical data nor judicial
authority supports more stringent pleading.04 The judicial per-
ception that civil rights actions are comparatively frivolous in
conjunction with their constituting a significant percentage of
the federal docket 5 could lead courts to associate the cases with
the litigation explosion, a major focus of Rule l1's 1983 amend-
ment.
Some judges have seemed indifferent to civil rights lawsuits,
while a few have exhibited hostility toward the actions.2 Indeed,
the apparent insensitivity to civil rights of a recent district court
judge nominated to the Eleventh Circuit led him to be the first
Bush Administration nominee whom the Senate has rejected.
231. One example is pro se prisoner suits under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 (1988).
232. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
233. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8; Jones v. Community Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646,
649 (9th Cir. 1984); supra note 209 and accompanying text. A few judges have expressly
stated that civil rights cases are more frivolous. See, e.g., Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi,
532 F.2d 920, 922 (3d Cir. 1976).
The Advisory Committee expressly required more stringent pleading only of plaintiffs
who allege fraud under Rule 9. See FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b). See generally Tobias, supra note
13, at 299 (discussing heightened pleading requirements).
234. See Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472, 1483 (5th Cir. 1985) (Higginbotham, J., concurring)
(discussing lack of authority); Rotolo, 532 F.2d at .927 (Gibbons, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (discussing lack of data). Numerbus courts may find that Rule 11 affords
a convenient way to discourage the pursuit of cases that judges already believed were
disproportionately frivolous, which may reflect their substantial concern about the litigation
explosion.
235. See supra notes 211-12 and accompanying text.
236. See, e.g., United States v. City of Chicago, 897 F.2d 243, 244 (7th Cir. 1990); Szabo
Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1083-85 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed,
485 U.S. 901 (1988).
237. See Neil A. Lewis, Bush Picking the Kind of Judges Reagan Favored, N.Y. TiMES,
Apr. 10, 1990, at Al (describing example of apparent insensitivity); Topics of the Times;
Judge Ryskamp's Own Words, N.Y. Tmms, Apr. 14, 1991, § 4, at 18 (discussing apparent
insensitivity and rejection).
The concepts in the text may also be demonstrated by the federal judiciary's growing
reluctance to enter certain forms of relief, such as structural decrees, that civil rights
plaintiffs frequently seek. Courts seem to find increasingly controversial the means for
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The factors examined mean that judges are rather likely to
raise Rule 11 sua sponte and to grant defendants' sanctions
motions in civil rights cases. Insofar as courts have formulated
negative impressions of civil rights plaintiffs, attorneys, and
litigation, the judges may not appreciate or consider certain
pertinent factors. These include most importantly the resource
deficiencies that plague many of the plaintiffs and lawyers, the
cutting-edge nature of much civil rights litigation, and express
congressional intent that the judiciary facilitate the plaintiffs'
vindication of fundamental civil rights.me
4. Alternatives to Rule 11
The wide range and relative efficacy of alternatives to Rule
11 that judges and environmental litigants have invoked could
explain the dearth of Rule 11 activity in environmental cases. Of
course, in much environmental litigation, disposition on the merits
may be preferable. As a lawyer who pursues toxic tort actions
cogently observed, the "goal of attorneys for plaintiffs is to get
to the end of the case rather than fight peripheral battles," which
are exemplified by satellite litigation involving Rule 11.M
Many courts apparently have considered the substantive res-
olution of disputes to be the best approach. A number of judges
have relied on numerous substitutes for Rule 11 that are as
effecting the relief, the judicial role that implementation necessitates, and the thorny
questions of federalism and deference to the political branches that can be implicated. For
helpful treatment of these issues, see DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY
(1977); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes
on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1984); Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme
Court, 1978 Term-Foreword The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1979); Robert F.
Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REV.
661 (1978).
238. Congressional intent is expressed in substantive, procedural, and fee-shifting legis-
lation. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 28 U.S.C. 5 1447 (1988); Civil Rights Attorney's
Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. S 1988 (1988). The Supreme Court also has recognized
that civil rights suits are essential to liberty. See, e.g., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828
(1977); Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (per curiam).
Individual judges' perceptions of Rule 11, as a valuable or worthless tool, for example,
may be important in specific cases. Those perceptions, however, seem to have limited
explanatory power, especially when the federal judiciary has been so willing to apply Rule
11 in civil rights cases and so reluctant to apply it in environmental cases. Cf. FINAL
REPORT, supra note 3, S 1A, at 1 (80% of district judges favor retaining Rule 11 in present
form, but a like number believe litigation abuse is minor problem).
239. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 21, supra note 132; cf. supra note 168
and accompanying text (noting desire of defense counsel in large firms to resolve litigation
on merits). But cf. infra notes 241-46 and accompanying text (describing defense techniques
that do not lead directly to resolution on merits).
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effective as the Rule. These substitutes include vigorous case
management (especially under Rule 16's requirements governing
pretrial conferences), civil contempt, the federal provision holding
attorneys liable for excessive costsu ° and state bar ethics re-
strictions.241
Many environmental litigants, principally defendants, have asked
that judges employ most of these measures and certain others
in lieu of Rule 11. One favored technique, which defense counsel
increasingly encourage federal courts to apply, is the Lone Pine
doctrine, named for the case in which a New Jersey state trial
judge originally articulated the concept.242 Lawyers for defen-
dants essentially seize on any perceived vulnerability in a plain-
tiffs case, typically involving causal links or unsettled scientific
questions, and request that the court discontinue discovery in
the litigation until the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing on
the disputed point.
Defendants in environmental actions have employed several
other mechanisms that can fairly be characterized as countersuits
and that are intended primarily to discourage the vigorous pur-
suit of environmental cases. The most notorious, and widely used,
alternative is Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation
(SLAPP) suits.244 These cases seek substantial damages from
environmental plaintiffs for commencing or participating in ad-
240. 28 U.S.C. S 1927 (1988).
241. See, e.g., Northside Sanitary Landfill v. City of Indianapolis, 902 F.2d 521, 523 (7th
Cir. 1990) (applying 28 US.C. S 1927, Polger v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 709 F. Supp. 204, 212
n.1 (D. Colo. 1989) (same); Can Am Indus. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 631 F. Supp.
1180, 1188 (C.D. M. 1986) (applying 28 U.S.C. S 1927 and Rule 65). See generally Carl Tobias,
Judicial Discretion and the 1983 Amendments to the Federal Civil Rules, 43 RUTGERS L. REV.
933, 944-46, 948-50 (1991) (discussing use of Rule 16, inherent judicial authority, and informal
threats as Rule 11 substitutes); Vairo, supra note 3, at 233 (arguing for use of S 1927 and
other informal means).
242. Lore v. Lone Pine Corp., No. L 33606-85 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Nov. 18, 1986)
(LEXIS, States library, NJ file).
243. Telephone Interviews with Attorneys Number 15, supra note 106 and Number 21,
supra note 132.
244. See, e.g., Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Mohla, 944 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1991).
For descriptions of the suits, see Joseph Brecher, The Public Interest and Intimidation
Suits: A New Approach, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 105 (1988); Penelope Canan & George W.
Pring, Studying Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation: Mixing Quantitative and
Qualitative Approaches, 22 LAW & Soc'y REV. 385 (1988); Eve Pell, SLAPPed Silly, CAL.
LAW., Feb. 1990, at 24. Professor George Pring, who received a National Science Foundation
grant to study SLAPP suits, observed that they have been employed in "hundreds of the
cases, only ten percent of which have been reported"; that environmental defendants prefer
the suits to Rule 11 because they threaten plaintiffs with greater exposure to liability; and
that the litigation typically is brought by local or regional entities. Telephone Interview
with Professor George Pring, Denver University College of Law (Mar. 19, 1991).
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ministrative proceedings or courtroom litigation.245 A second at-
torney involved in many toxic tort actions stated that SLAPP
suits "scare victims who have been exposed to toxic materials to
death" and that his "clients are absolutely freaked out by the
cases."246 Litigation under the Racketeering Influenced and Cor-
rupt Organizations Act (RICO) is another form of countersuit to
which defense counsel resort, though less frequently.247
Numerous reasons justify courts', lawyers', and parties' reli-
ance on alternatives to Rule 11. Judges and plaintiffs may have
preferred certain options, such as merits-disposition and vigorous
case management, because the alternatives achieve Rule l1's
primary purpose of deterring litigation abuse as effectively as
the Rule while minimizing the Rule's principal disadvantages-
limiting federal court access, chilling legitimate lawsuits, eroding
civility among judges, attorneys and parties, and spawning sat-
ellite litigation. 24 Public interest litigants apparently appreciate
that Rule 11 as written intrinsically favors defendants and, thus,
is rather ineffective. For example, the limited time that the
Federal Rules afford defendants to file answers makes those
responses less vulnerable to sanctions motions.249
Some environmental defendants and defense counsel may have
different perspectives on Rule l's purposes and diverse views
of efficacy as it relates to the invocation of alternatives. For
instance, Rule l's compensatory objective may appear significant
to a defe.ndant who has incurred substantial costs in successfully
resisting charges that it damaged the air or water and wishes
to recover those expenses.
245. See Canan & Pring, supra note 244; Pell, supra note 244; Telephone Interview with
Professor George Pring, supra note 244.
246. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 15, supra note 106.
247. An asbestos manufacturer pursued the leading case against tire workers who
allegedly were injured by exposure to asbestos and who had settled their claims with the
manufacturer. See Raymark Indus. v. Stemple, 714 F. Supp. 460, 468-76 (D. Kan. 1988); see
also In re Tire Workers Asbestos Litig., 125 F.R.D. 617 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (discussing charges
of fraud against tire workers). See generally Al Buchanan, Note, Evolving RICO Issues for
the EnvironmentaNatural Resources Practitioner, 6 J. MIN. L. & PoL'Y 185 (1990-91)
(discussing the application of RICO to environmental cases).
248. See supra notes 161-65, 239-41 and accompanying text; cf Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx
Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2454 (1990) (discussing Rule 11's purposes and disadvantages); William
W. Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1013 (1988) (same).
249. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(a) (defendants generally have 20 days to answer);, see also
PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 2, at 2 (setting forth proposed Rule 11(b), which expressly
subjects defendants' papers to Rule's requirements).
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Correspondingly, defense counsel who want to limit similar
costs from the outset of litigation primarily by restricting an
action's scope will consider the Lone Pine doctrinem more effec-
tive than Rule 11. Lone Pine motions can reduce defendants'
expenditures, particularly on discovery, by suspending much pre-
trial activity in suits and immersing them in complex medical
and scientific questions, while requiring that plaintiffs spend large
sums to have expert witnesses conduct complicated analytical
research and encouraging the litigants to settle.251 An important
incentive for defendants to exercise this and other options is that
they deflect attention from the substance of environmental dis-
putes, thereby permitting defendants to evade responsibility for
pollution.
SLAPP suits afford another telling example. The principal
reason why many environmental defendants pursue these actions
is to expose environmental plaintiffs to "liability which is orders
of magnitude larger than Rule 11" and defendants, therefore,
substantially increase the potential for chilling the plaintiffs and
for restricting federal court access. 25
Several theories explain why the appeal of, and reliance on,
SLAPP suits and other alternatives have increased since Rule
ll's amendment in 1983. Defense counsel had little initial success
either in persuading courts that plaintiffs had contravened the
provision or in convincing judges to impose substantial sanctions
on plaintiffs found in violation.2 This refusal to award large
assessments and judicial recognition that deterrence, not com-
pensation, is the Rule's primary purpose rendered it ineffective
as a mechanism for recouping litigation expenses and for dis-
couraging environmental litigation.25
250. See supra notes 242-43 and accompanying text.
251. See Telephone Interviews with Attorneys Number 15, supra note 106; Number 21,
supra note 132; cf supra note 188 (arguing that such tactics may preclude the use of Rule
11).
252. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 15, supra note 106; accord Telephone
Interview with Professor George Pring, supra note 244.
253. See supra notes 31-57 and accompanying text; Telephone Interview with Attorney
Number 15, supra note 106 ("jurisprudence of Rule 11 in environmental cases" never
developed because initial lack of success discouraged defense counsel who resorted to other
mechanisms); Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 23 (Apr. 11, 1991) (same).
254. None of the attorneys for public interest litigants whom I interviewed believed that
Rule 11 discouraged their organizations from litigating. Cff supra note 246 and accompanying
text (indicating that SLAPPs discourage individuals who consider pursuing toxic tort
litigation); see also Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2454 (1990) (providing
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Related peculiarities of litigation financing also explain why
environmental litigants have invoked alternatives to Rule 11.
Public interest litigants can secure attorneys' fees under most
environmental statutes when they prevail and thus have little
reason to employ the Rule for compensatory objectives.215 Gov-
ernmental plaintiffs and defendants may be relatively uncon-
cerned about recovering litigation costs, while some private
defendants may prefer absorbing those expenses to running the
risks entailed in seeking to recoup them from plaintiffs.m
B. Lessons
1. Rule 11's Advantages and Disadvantages
This analysis of Rule 11 activity in environmental lawsuits
supports tentative assessments of the benefits and disadvantages
of the provision's implementation. Rule 11 may encourage certain
environmental plaintiffs and their counsel to "stop and think"
before filing court papers. The Rule, therefore, could limit some-
what the quantity of frivolous papers submitted and the amount
of litigation abuse in environmental cases.m Both amounts ap-
parently had been small, however, when Rule 11 was amended
in 1983, and the subsequent dearth may be attributable to factors
already examined, such as the incentives that motivate environ-
mental plaintiffs to conduct prefiling inquiries and to file papers
that seem to satisfy the Rule.259
The relative lack of Rule 11 activity in environmental litigation
and courts' reluctance to sanction, and solicitude for, environ-
mental plaintiffs and lawyers suggest that the Rule has not chilled
judicial recognition that deterrence, not compensation, is Rule 11's primary purpose); supra
notes 47-53 and accompanying text (discussing courts' refusal to award large sanctions
against environmental plaintiffs). See generally supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text
(discussing abuse of discretion standard for Rule 11 decisions).
255. See upra notes 82, 144 and accompanying text; cf. supra note 248 and accompanying
text (noting that plaintiffs may be loath to invoke Rule 11 because of its potential to limit
federal court access and to chill legitimate litigation).
256. See supra note 191.
257. See supra notes 166-72 and accompanying text, supra note 204.
258. I am not implying that the quantity of either has been large. Cf Schwarzer, supra
note 248, at 1014-15 (asserting that Rule 11 generally has caused attorneys to stop and
think and has deterred some frivolous litigation).
259. See supra notes 135-46 and accompanying text; cf Glaser v. Cincinnati Milacron, Inc.,
808 F.2d 285 (3d Cir. 1986) (reversing $165,000 attorney fee award under pre-1983 version
of Rule 11 to 89 benzene manufacturers who were dismissed from the action because
plaintiffs' prefiling investigation was not so deficient as to constitute subjective bad faith).
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parties and attorneys who pursue most kinds of environmental
actions.26° Correspondingly, application of Rule 11 in ways that
disadvantaged plaintiffs has been more ubiquitous in civil rights
suits than in certain types of public law cases and may not even
be occurring in other forms of that litigation. The infrequent
invocation of Rule 11 in environmental actions probably means
that many judges, litigants, and lawyers involved in the suits
have experienced neither the loss of civility nor the increase in
satellite litigation that Rule 11 has provoked in other types of
cases.all
These "benefits" should be qualified, and some advantages
actually could be detriments. Most significantly, the ideas are
premised primarily on formal Rule 11 activity, which has appar-
ently disadvantaged public interest litigants, including environ-
mental plaintiffs, less than informal activity.2 2 Informal Rule 11
activity, thus, may be dampening the enthusiasm of numerous
environmental plaintiffs and attorneys, especially those who bring
more controversial environmental actions, such as toxic tort suits.
Encouraging environmental plaintiffs and lawyers to "stop and
think" before filing may not be an unqualified benefit and might
have deleterious side effects. For example, it increases the "front-
end" costs of litigation, expenses that apparently cannot be
recouped, and imposes them on parties and attorneys, a number
of whom have limited ability to bear the costs.263 Indeed, threats
to employ Rule 11 in toxic tort cases have "made counsel for
plaintiffs so paranoid that they cling to precedent and plead
traditional theories," thereby discouraging innovation in an oth-
erwise dynamic area of environmental law.264
These and related concerns, such as the possible need to spend
large sums participating in unnecessary satellite litigation or
260. See supra note 253; of. infra notes 264-67 and accompanying text (discussing chilling
effect of informal Rule 11 activity).
261. These disadvantages and those enumerated above in note 248 and the accompanying
text are ones that have been especially problematic in civil rights cases. See Tobias, supra
note 167, at 163-64; see also INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMM. ON CIVILITY OF THE SEVENTH
FEDERAL JuDicuAL CIRcurr 20 (1991) (describing Rule 11 sanctions as "incivility flash point").
262. This informal activity has especially disadvantaged civil rights plaintiffs. See Tobias,
supra note 25, at 501-02.
263. See supm notes 70-74 and accompanying text (recounting instance in which expenses
could not be reouped) Tobias, supra note 25, at 495-98 (discussing front-end costs and
persons with limited ability to bear).
264. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 15, supra note 106. The attorney was
alluding to the propensity of plaintiffs' counsel to plead "duty to warn" in accord with the
early leading precedent of Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products, 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
1992] . 483
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
appealing trial court imposition of sanctions, could dissuade en-
vironmental plaintiffs and lawyers from commencing, or zealously
pursuing, legitimate actions. This effect is especially true of suits
that advocate novel or creative legal theories; involve voluminous,
unclear or sharply contested facts; are close legally, scientifically,
or factually; raise controversial issues; or are expensive to liti-
gate.265 For example, in the recent First Circuit case in which
two respected members of the Maine bar appealed a Rule 11
sanction of $250 levied by the district judge,26 the attorneys
probably spent thousands of dollars to contest the decision. They
apparently did so as a "matter of principle" and to protect their
reputations, even though the First Circuit found that the lower
court had not abused its discretion in what the appellate panel
acknowledged was a close case.267
Numerous "advantages" described above are attributable to
the low incidence of Rule 11 activity in environmental litigation.
Some of the comparative inactivity can be ascribed to the in-
formed judgments of many environmental defendants and defense
counsel that Rule 11 is a rather ineffective mechanism for achiev-
ing their purposes. Certain of the objectives correspondingly may
have questionable validity. These include discouraging environ-
mental plaintiffs and lawyers from instituting and vigorously
pursuing environmental actions, imposing substantial litigation
costs on the parties and attorneys, and diverting the focus of
lawsuits from the merits to extraneous matters, thus avoiding
responsibility for environmental degradation.
2. Study of Rule 11
The assessment of Rule 11 activity in environmental litigation
affords insights on conducting additional studies of the Rule and
similar evaluations. The experience discloses certain difficulties
in performing the research. For instance, relying too substantially
on reported judicial opinions and even on formal activity can
undermine accuracy because much Rule 11 activity is informal,
265. It is impossible to discern the number of valid cases that have not been pursued
because of these concerns. See supra note 83.
266. Maine Audubon Soc'y v. Purslow, 907 F2d 265 (1st Cir. 1990).
267. See id. at 266, 269; supra note 60 and accompanying text; cf. Golden Eagle Distrib.
Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986) (providing another example of large
expenditures to litigate a matter of principle). The result in Purslow is particularly troubling
because considerable environmental litigation that is not undertaken by institutional plain-
tiffs is performed by lawyers on a pro bono basis.
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as has been much of the activity that seemingly disadvantages
public interest litigants the most.268 This potential problem ap-
parently did not materialize in environmental cases, because the
quantity and effects of both formal and informal activity seemed
so similar.
Speaking with attorneys who participate actively in environ-
mental disputes, however, enhances understanding of Rule 11
and environmental litigation in ways that examining published
judicial decisions cannot. For example, such opinions rarely enable
readers to discern the reasons why environmental plaintiffs file
certain cases, to comprehend the parties' ongoing relations with
judges and other environmental litigants, or to appreciate the
multitude of alternatives to Rule 11 and why they might have
seemed preferable. This analysis of environmental suits thus
emphasizes the importance of consulting sources in addition to
published determinations.2N 9
Correspondingly, gathering data on informal Rule 11 activity
may be quite expensive, because considerable relevant informa-
tion is anecdotal. Some instructive material, therefore, can be
assembled most effectively by conducting time-consuming tele-
phone or personal interviews or by circulating carefully phrased
questionnaires and compiling the responses. 10
This difficulty, and the study as a whole, illustrate the com-
plications of collecting, analyzing, and synthesizing applicable
empirical data and of drawing justifiable conclusions from the
material assembled.2' Attempting to premise credible assess-
ments on the internal dynamics of such multifaceted and byzan-
tine institutions as the federal courts and large law firms can be
especially problematic. To designate and to accord relative re-
sponsibility to the pertinent variables that could explain why
Rule 11 is invoked more frequently in certain forms of CERCLA
268. See Tobias, supra note 25, at 501-03; Tobias, supra note 167, at 170 n.46; cf BURBANK,
supra note 10, at 45, 59 (explaining that considerable Rule 11 activity is informal).
269. Cf. Burbank, supra note 11, at 193940 (calling for law faculty to undertake empirical
research outside of law schools).
270. The Federal Judicial Center circulated a questionnaire to all federal district judges
in its recent study. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, SS 2A-2C. The American Judicature
Society recently circulated a questionnaire to lawyers in the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth
Circuits who had had experience with Rule 11 during the preceding year. See AiMRIcAN
JUDICATURE SOcIETY RULE 11 STUDY PREImINARY ANALYSIS (1991).
271. See Richard L. Marcus, Public Law Litigation and Legal Scholarship, 21 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 647, 686-91 (1988) (discussing problems entailed in treating empirical data).
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litigation than in some kinds of NEPA cases is equally difficult.272
The examination of Rule 11 activity in environmental lawsuits
offers additiohal perspectives on this type of effort. Before un-
dertaking the evaluation, I speculated that Rule ll's application
was affecting environmental plaintiffs and lawyers adversely,
because substantial Rule 11 activity has disadvantaged civil rights
plaintiffs and attorneys. Moreover, since 1986, several writers
and numerous public interest and civil rights lawyers have sug-
gested that Rule 11 activity in public law cases apart from civil
rights actions might be adversely affecting public interest liti-
gants.27 Finding that Rule 11 activity in environmental suits was
less detrimental to plaintiffs than I had projected underscores
the importance of maintaining a neutral, detached viewpoint and
of formulating conclusions only after assembling and analyzing
sufficient data.274
The study also demonstrates the need both to differentiate
between forms of public law litigation, even between those that
have the number of similarities that exist between such paradig-
matic kinds of modern litigation as environmental lawsuits and
civil rights actions,27 and to distinguish between the various
types of environmental cases and civil rights litigation.276 Public
law suits and environmental cases are not monolithic.
The analysis illustrates as well the hazards of overgeneraliza-
tion. The great discrepancies between Rule 11 activity in envi-
ronmental actions and civil rights lawsuits can be ascribed to the
different views that participants in the cases have of both types
of litigation's purposes, of the reasons for invoking Rule 11, and
of alternatives to it. These ideas offer the best generalized
explanation of the disparities, but the concepts do not purport
272. This analysis of potential variables obviously is not exhaustive. See generally supra
notes 23-24 and accompanying text (discussing problem of defining public law litigation);
infra note 276 and accompanying text (discussing problem of distinguishing types of
environmental cases).
273. See, e.g., Arthur B. La France, Federal Rule 11 and Public Interest Litigation, 22
VAL. U. L. Rnv. 331 (1988); Tobias, supra note 167, at 170; Tobias, supra note 25, at 502-03
(citing telephone interviews); Vairo, supra note 3, at 200-02.
274. Professor Marcus observed that "scholarly insights sometimes lead in directions the
scholar finds discomfiting ... [blut that conclusion underscores the importance of the
dispassionate scholar who observes and explores without a stake in a particular outcome:'
Marcus, supra note 271, at 694.
275. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
276. Examples include the distinction between toxic tort litigation and other forms of
environmental litigation. See, e.g., supra notes 202-03, 264 and accompanying text. See
generally supra notes 106-122, 195-201 and accompanying text (discussing differences among
various types of environmental suits).
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to be exhaustive or to explain specific situations. What is occur-
ring in particular circumstances will depend on the constellation
of variables comprising them, each of which must be identified,
isolated, and assigned relevance.'
In sum, although most explanations for Rule 11 activity in
environmental lawsuits inform understanding of the Rule, the
cases, and the current legal culture in the federal courts, they
are not dispositive. Ironically, the explanations neither defini-
tively resolve the controversy that has attended Rule l1's imple-
mentation since 1983 nor clearly indicate the best course of future
action. Indeed, some of them even exacerbate that controversy' 8
IV. CONCLUSION
The evaluation of Rule l1's implementation in environmental
litigation shows that little formal or informal activity has oc-
curred. Courts have evinced solicitude for environmental plain-
tiffs, few of whom have been sanctioned. These determinations
contrast sharply with findings derived from studying the Rule's
application in civil rights cases. Rule 11 activity in those lawsuits
has been highly controversial and has dampened the enthusiasm
of civil rights plaintiffs and lawyers. Because the Rule has det-
rimentally affected them and other parties and attorneys while
imposing considerable cost on the civil justice system, numerous
observers have suggested that the provision promptly be amended,
and those with rule-revising responsibility have recently proposed
amendment. The disadvantages may well warrant expeditious
revision of the Rule, even though minimal Rule 11 activity has
been present in environmental litigation, judges have enforced
the provision with comparative solicitude for environmental plain-
tiffs, and the study of Rule ll's implementation in environmental
cases affords instructive insights on modern civil litigation.
277. See Carl W. Tobias, Of Public Funds and Public Participation: Resolving the Issue of
Agency Authority to Reimburse Public Partcipants in Administrative Proceedings, 82 CoLUM.
L. REv. 906, 954 (1982); Carl Tobias, Rule 19 and the Public Rights Exception to Party
Joinder, 65 N.C. L. REv. 745, 791 (1987).
278. Nonetheless, the Advisory Committee proposed in August, 1991, that Rule 11 be
amended. See supra note 6.
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